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ESSAY
THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW
Clare Huntington*
Historically, the legal system justified family law’s rules and
policies through morality, common sense, and prevailing cultural
norms. In a sharp departure, and consistent with a broader trend
across the legal system, empirical evidence increasingly dominates the
regulation of families.
There is much to celebrate in this empirical turn. Properly used,
empirical evidence in family law can help the state act more effectively
and efficiently, unmask prejudice, and depoliticize contentious battles.
But the empirical turn also presents substantial concerns. Beyond
perennial issues of the quality of empirical evidence and the ability of
legal actors to use it, there are more fundamental problems: Using
empirical evidence focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules,
discouraging a debate about contested and competing values. Reliance
on empirical evidence overlays a veneer of neutrality on normative
judgments. And uncritically adopting evidence about present conditions
without interrogating the role of historical discrimination that
continues to disadvantage some families can replicate that
discrimination.
Given the promise and peril of the empirical turn in family law,
this Essay proposes a framework to guide the use of this evidence. The
framework preserves space for debating multiple values and advises
decisionmakers when to use empirical evidence, with particular
attention to the dangers for nondominant families. The framework also
recommends strengthening evidentiary gatekeeping and elevating the
potential for legal scholarship to serve as a bridge from the broader
research base to the courts. With this guidance in place, empirical
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evidence can take its rightful place as a useful but cabined tool in the
legal regulation of families.
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INTRODUCTION
At the crux of the fight over marriage equality, a court in northern
California conducted a remarkable twelve-day trial.1 Faced with a
1. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
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challenge to the State’s marriage restriction, the court heard evidence on
a range of social facts relating to family structure and child outcomes, the
physical and economic benefits of marriage, the nature of sexual
orientation, and the increased risk of physical and mental harm from
discrimination and stigma.2 This empirical evidence was pivotal to the
court’s decision striking down the marriage restriction. A crucial part of
the decision was the finding that children of same-sex parents have similar outcomes to children raised by different-sex couples, undermining
California’s rationale for differentiating couples based on sexual
orientation.3
This example of relying on empirical evidence—defined broadly as
research and data gathered through both quantitative and qualitative
methods4—to resolve fundamental questions of family law is hardly
unique. Consistent with an increasingly widespread reliance on empirical
evidence across sectors of the economy, academic disciplines, and within
the law,5 family law decisionmakers regularly draw on sociology,
psychology, neuroscience, data analytics, and related social and hard
sciences to make critical choices about the legal regulation of families.6
In addition to using empirical evidence to decide constitutional cases,
courts turn to psychological research about parental alienation syndrome
to decide custody suits.7 Lawmakers draw on studies about the harms of
foster care to drastically revamp the child welfare system.8 And agency

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Kenji Yoshino, Speak Now:
Marriage Equality on Trial 91–228 (2015) (describing the trial in detail).
2. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. at 932–38.
3. See id. at 935, 950, 963–73, 981, 994–1003.
4. This Essay loosely contrasts this empirical information with values. There exists a
longstanding, if contested, distinction between the two. See David Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature 458–70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed.
1978) (1739–1740) (discussing the distinction between moral judgments and empirical
facts). As explored throughout this Essay, the line between empirical evidence and values
is blurred, and one often informs the other. Empirical evidence can influence values in
numerous ways identified in this Essay, but values can also influence empirical evidence,
partly because knowledge is inherently situated in culture. This is particularly true in the
social sciences, but it can also be true in the hard sciences. The political and cultural
valence of juvenile crime, for example, accounts at least in part for the research agenda of
neuroscientists interested in adolescent brain development. See generally Hilary Putnam,
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays 28–45 (2002) (demonstrating
how the distinction between facts and values breaks down in numerous ways); Ruth Anna
Putnam, Creating Facts and Values, 60 Phil. 187, 190–204 (1985) (arguing facts are valueladen and values are fact-laden).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 34–43.
6. See infra section I.B.
7. See infra section I.B.1.e.
8. See infra section I.B.2.
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officials mine data about risk factors for child abuse and neglect to
construct predictive analytics for family intervention.9
Despite this stark shift in family law, there is limited, albeit growing,
scholarly attention to the subject. Some family law scholars have explored
the use of empirical evidence in specific contexts,10 but few interrogate
or analyze the larger trend.11
9. See infra section I.B.3.
10. See, e.g., Libby Adler, Just the Facts: The Perils of Expert Testimony and Findings
of Fact in Gay Rights Litigation, 7 Unbound: Harv. J. Legal Left 1, 19–21 (2011) (noting
the multiple downsides of the empirical battle over marriage equality, including that the
facts found are not stably pro-gay and instead can be used by anti-gay advocates); Susan
Frelich Appleton, Gender and Parentage: Family Law’s Equality Project in Our Empirical
Age, in What Is Parenthood? Contemporary Debates About the Family 237, 245–48 (Linda
C. McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013) (critiquing the use of empirical studies to determine
the proper place of gender in parentage laws); Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a ChildFriendly Child Welfare System: The Use and Misuse of Research, 13 Whittier J. Child &
Fam. Advoc. 1, 10–14 (2014) (arguing that inaccurate statistical reports in a national study
of child maltreatment—which found similar rates of maltreatment across races—fed
claims of bias in the child welfare system and supported family-preservation efforts); Joan
S. Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory: Is It Really Empirically Supported? 12 J. Child
Custody 4 (2015) [hereinafter Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory] (analyzing the
empirical basis for a purported typology of intimate partner violence and finding that the
empirical evidence does not support the claimed differentiation). Helpfully, the Family
Court Review published a “Researchers’ Roundtable,” addressing the problem of
translating social science about families into legal rules. See Researchers’ Roundtable, 54
Fam. Ct. Rev. 134, 134–66 (2016).
11. There are two notable exceptions. Professor Margaret Brinig, one of the leading
advocates and producers of empirical work in family law, has identified several reasons why
research on families may not be reliable and may not translate well into legal rules and
policies, including the following: population heterogeneity, the confidentiality or
unavailability of data, bias by principal investigators, and the absence of control groups.
See Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1083, 1084–94
[hereinafter Brinig, Empirical Work] (describing challenges in conducting reliable
empirical work on family law and arguing that scholars and legislatures should neither
respond too quickly to any single study nor overstate the likelihood that a law will change
behavior). Brinig thus addresses questions about data reliability and the translation of
empirical evidence by legal actors, both touched upon in sections II.B.1 and II.B.2. Brinig
does not, however, address the other concerns of this Essay: the tendency of empirical
evidence to obscure the importance of a range of values, conceal normative judgments,
and normalize discrimination. See infra section II.B.2. Additionally, Professor Peggy
Cooper Davis has explored an important aspect of an empirically based family law: the
process by which judges absorb and use social science evidence in family law cases as they
relate to legislative facts. See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of
Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539, 1542 (1987) [hereinafter
Davis, There Is a Book Out] (noting the article was “undertaken to identify the ways in
which judges find and use legislative facts; to discover whether there are patterns of
misuse; and to document the effect of legislative facts upon the development of law”).
Davis does not, however, engage more broadly with the use of empirical evidence across
the institutions of family law and many of the questions explored in this Essay. Perhaps
most importantly, Davis does not explore the central concern of this Essay: that empirical
evidence discourages a debate about competing values. See infra sections II.B.2, III.A. For
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There is much to celebrate about this empirical turn in family law.
Traditionally, decisionmakers in family law have drawn on a combination
of moral judgments, prevailing cultural norms, and perceived common
sense.12 An empirical grounding for family law has considerable
advantages over this historical approach. 13 A detailed understanding of
family life and the legal system is essential to the development of effective
rules. Rigorous consideration of empirical evidence can guide state
investments, promoting the efficient and effective use of scarce resources,
and it can give decisionmakers a clearer sense of areas in which legal
inputs might yield particular social outcomes. It can help family law be
more inclusive and move beyond narrow dominant norms. And it holds
the potential to help depoliticize battles over family recognition and
support, or at least to separate political arguments and social beliefs from
the empirical evidence.14 It is not surprising, then, that Professor Kenji
Yoshino would say, of legal contests that turn on legislative facts, “[l]et
there be a trial.”15

an argument that family law sorely lacks an empirical basis and that family law scholars
should do more to produce and engage with empirical work about families, see Carl E.
Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical Scholarship and American
Law, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 53, 78–91.
12. See infra section I.A.
13. See infra section II.A.
14. Indeed, with the new presidential Administration skeptical about well-settled
science, evidence may be more important than ever. Perhaps the best example of
President Trump’s willingness to ignore overwhelming scientific evidence is climate
change. Compare Juliet Eilperin, Trump Says “Nobody Really Knows” If Climate Change
Is Real, Wash. Post (Dec. 11, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/12/11/trump-says-nobody-really-knows-if-climate-change-is-real/
?utm_term=.9a2c5009c609 [http://perma.cc/9SV7-FHPC] (reporting then-Presidentelect Trump as saying about climate change, “I’m still open-minded. Nobody really
knows”), with Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, Global Climate Change,
NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ [http://perma.cc/YF6S-FUZQ] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“[Ninety-seven] percent or more of actively publishing climate
scientists agree: Climate-warming trends over the past century are extremely likely due to
human activities.”). President Trump’s skepticism about the well-settled evidence on
childhood vaccines, however, is a good example within family law. See Michael D. Shear et
al., Anti-Vaccine Activist Says Trump Wants Him to Lead Panel on Immunization Safety,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/politics/antivaccine-activist-trump-immunizations.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing how then-President-elect Trump met with Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a vaccine
skeptic, and asked him to lead a commission on vaccine safety). For a discussion of
empirical evidence and the legal debate about mandatory vaccines, see infra text
accompanying notes 237–244.
15. Yoshino, supra note 1, at 280 (emphasis omitted); see also Linda Greenhouse
& Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion
Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 Yale L.J. Forum 149, 156–61 (2016), http://
www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/11.Greenhouse-SiegelFinalforPDF_io54a7ck.pdf [http://
perma.cc/4U7V-DMPL] (arguing a rigorous application of the undue burden test that

232

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:227

But not so fast. Despite its considerable benefits, the empirical turn
in family law also presents substantial concerns. As a threshold matter,
there are well-rehearsed issues with the quality of the research and the
capacity of legal actors to use empirical evidence in a nuanced manner.16
These concerns take on a particular hue in the context of family law, in
which research about families addresses complex questions such as the
relationship between family structure and child outcomes.17 Moreover,
even the most sophisticated research can leave out variables that are
difficult to quantify and yet are central to family life—love and a sense of
belonging, distrust and a sense of dislocation.18 In these ways, empirical
evidence tells us something, but not everything, about family life.
More fundamentally, empirical evidence exerts a gravitational influence on decisionmaking in a number of deeply troubling ways. To begin,
the empirical turn focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules. Many
of these outcomes, notably child well-being and the reduction of family
violence, embody important values, and family law is rightly focused on
these concerns. But there are competing, and often contested, values
also at play in family law, including equality, autonomy, pluralism, and
inclusion, to mention but a few.19 The focus on the outcomes of legal
rules discourages a forthright debate about these competing values and
the tradeoffs inherent in any legal regulation. Moreover, even if
decisionmakers address the full range of values at issue, empirical
evidence does not tell decisionmakers how to weight the competing
values. It can clarify the stakes in a debate and show how different policy
options further different values, but empirical evidence does not help
decisionmakers prioritize competing values and thus should not play an
outsized role.
Compounding the problem, decisionmaking based on empirical
evidence appears neutral, allowing legal actors to sidestep difficult and
contentious debates, such as which families deserve legal recognition and
draws on empirical evidence is a promising new front in the fight to protect reproductive
rights).
16. See infra section II.B.1.
17. See infra sections II.B.1–.2.
18. See infra section II.B.1.
19. See infra section II.B.3. Simply naming the values at play in family law is a fraught
endeavor, both because they are so numerous and because they often conflict. By
mentioning a few in the text, and omitting others clearly at play, such as the privatization
of dependency, the goal is not to elevate some values over others but rather to underscore
that family law is heavily and inevitably value-laden. For a discussion of the changing values
in family law, see Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
225, 227–29, 236–48 (1997) (reviewing Nancy E. Dowd, In Defense of Single-Parent
Families (1997) & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture (1997)) (arguing that,
with the challenge to traditional morality as a justification for family law, there is a
competing vision for family law—the “new family morality”—that embraces values
including gender equality, caregiving, and commitment).

2018]

THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW

233

support or which families should receive coercive intervention because of
concerns about child abuse and neglect.20 In the child welfare system, for
example, the adoption of predictive analytics to triage suspected cases of
child abuse and neglect allows agency officials to throw up their hands
and claim they are simply following the algorithm, thus avoiding
questions about whether the system improperly intervenes in the lives of
low-income families of color.21
Finally, relying on empirical evidence poses particular dangers to
nondominant families. The use of empirical evidence risks describing
present conditions without interrogating the role of historical
discrimination that continues to disadvantage some families.22 Advocates
challenging the heightened protections for removing Native American
children from their homes in cases of abuse and neglect, for example,
contend that this policy harms child well-being.23 But evidence on child
outcomes obscures the role of historical discrimination—indeed,
genocide—against Native American families. Government policies are a
direct cause of instability in Native American families,24 and uncritically
adopting the evidence on outcomes replicates discrimination against this
marginalized population.
To understand these concerns with empirical evidence, consider
debates over custody and visitation rights for unmarried fathers.25 Unlike
divorced and married fathers, there is not clear evidence that
maintaining a relationship between unmarried fathers and their children
improves child outcomes.26 As courts and legislatures decide the rules for
unmarried fathers, the absence of empirical evidence showing positive
child outcomes is likely to be influential. But focusing on child well-being
ignores the other value-based reasons for protecting father–child
relationships, including gender equality and fathers’ liberty interests in
the relationship. Foregrounding child outcomes provides a seemingly
neutral rationale for the choice not to protect the parental rights of a
socially marginalized group. And taking the empirical evidence at face
value disregards government policies, such as mass incarceration,27 that
20. See infra section II.B.2.b.
21. See infra section III.B.2.
22. See infra section II.B.2.c.
23. For a discussion of this example, see infra text accompanying notes 313–316
(explaining that the plaintiffs are challenging both the heightened removal standards and
the preference for placement with Native American families).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 345–347.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 317–320.
26. See infra text accompanying note 318.
27. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness 4 (rev. ed. 2012) (describing how mass incarceration operates “as a
stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that
functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow”).
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make it harder for some unmarried fathers, particularly fathers of color,
to play a beneficial social and economic role in their children’s lives.28 In
short, there are reasons to be highly cautious about the use of empirical
evidence in some contexts.
To be clear, this Essay does not condemn empirical evidence writ
large. As noted throughout, empirical evidence does and should play a
vital role in answering many family law questions and guiding family
policies. But it is essential to have a nuanced understanding of what the
empirical turn means for family law and to be ready to bend the arc toward its most promising trajectory.
How, then, should family law use empirical evidence? This Essay
proposes a framework for taking advantage of the benefits of empirical
evidence while also guarding against the significant concerns raised by
the empirical turn. Not all questions are amenable to resolution through
empirical analysis, and decisionmakers must know when and why to use
this evidence. Decisionmakers should generally rely on empirical
evidence when seeking to achieve a particular, agreed-upon outcome,
such as reducing family violence, when the valence of the choice is
relatively uncontested and when there is a general agreement about how
to balance competing values. In this context, empirical evidence can
guide choices among rules and policies, highlighting effective and efficient means for reducing violence. But contested and competing values
inhere in family law, and it is critical to preserve space for debating these
values. Empirical evidence can play a limited role in debates about
values, but decisionmakers should not use it to avoid a debate about contested values and norms, nor should decisionmakers prioritize only those
values that are more amenable to measurement or are more compelling
because of evidence.
Even when empirical evidence is relevant, decisionmakers must be
cautious about how they use it. To guide this nuance, this Essay’s
framework calls for more effective gatekeeping mechanisms across the
institutions of family law. It warns decisionmakers to be attentive to the
potential for empirical evidence to reflect and refract the legal salience
of intersecting identities, including race, gender, and class. And the
framework encourages a robust role for legal scholars to make empirical
evidence accessible and comprehensible for those crafting legal rules
and policies.

28. See Donald Braman, Doing Time on the Outside: Incarceration and Family Life
in Urban America 37–96, 177–87 (2007) (describing the impact of incarceration on
prisoners’ families); Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender
Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 Va. L. Rev. 893, 894–
98 (2014) (describing the employment impact of a criminal record and noting that this
disproportionately affects men of color).
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This Essay focuses on the empirical turn in family law, but empirical
evidence is now an entrenched feature of the legal system.29 By exploring
the benefits and dangers of the empirical turn in one context, this Essay
contributes to the broader debate about the use of empirical evidence
trans-substantively in the law.30 Although some of the concerns identified
in this Essay are family law specific, such as the general disregard for the
Daubert test in family court,31 most of the issues are generalizable, and
this Essay thus holds lessons for other areas of the law.32
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes the increasingly
widespread use of empirical evidence across many family law contexts.
Part II unpacks the substantial benefits of, and significant concerns
raised by, this empirical turn. Part III draws on this descriptive and
analytical foundation to chart a path for the use of empirical evidence in
family law.
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE COMES TO FAMILY LAW
Empirical evidence is so thoroughly integrated into modern life that
it is easy to overlook its existence.33 Decisionmakers in the public,34
29. See infra text accompanying notes 38–43.
30. To give one example, Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski has argued that empirical
evidence may make sense of that large debate in domains in which singularly focused
outcomes can be reasonable organizing principles—as in medicine, with the goal of
treating patients effectively, or business, with the goal of profit maximization. See Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 901, 917–19 (2011). In law, however,
the endeavor is more fraught because law is inherently political, with often contested and
competing goals. See id.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 166–169 (describing the failure of most family
court judges to use the Daubert test to screen out unreliable expert testimony).
32. Thus, this Essay resists family law exceptionalism, see Janet Halley, What Is Family
Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 3–6 (2011) (describing and challenging
family law exceptionalism), and instead uses family law as an example of the benefits, but
also potential dangers, of the broader empirical turn.
33. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 129 (P. M. S. Hacker &
Joachim Schulte eds., G. E. M. Anscombe et al. trans., 4th ed. 2009) (1953) (“The aspects
of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and
familiarity.”).
34. In the public sector, Mayor Michael Bloomberg was a leader in basing public
policies on quantitative data, using them in multiple areas, including public health,
building and transportation safety, climate change, and poverty. See Michael Flowers,
Beyond Open Data: The Data-Driven City, in Beyond Transparency: Open Data and
the Future of Civic Innovation 185, 187–95 (Brett Goldstein & Lauren Dyson eds.,
2013) (describing New York City’s experience beginning to use data to drive decisions
on multiple fronts including city infrastructure and building safety); Alan Feuer, The
Mayor’s Geek Squad, N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/24/nyregion/mayor-bloombergs-geek-squad.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing the use of data-driven decisionmaking in multiple policy areas under
Mayor Bloomberg). But see Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658–67
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding the city’s data-driven stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional). For
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private,35 and nonprofit sectors36 regularly rely on empirical evidence.37
Similarly, the legal system has long integrated empirical evidence.38 Since
at least the era of the Brandeis brief, legal actors have drawn on data
from the social and hard sciences.39 Economic analysis is thoroughly
embedded in the law.40 The judicial system has developed methods for

further discussion of evidence-based policymaking in the public sector, see Ian Ayres,
Super Crunchers: Why Thinking-by-Numbers Is the New Way to Be Smart 69–87 (2007)
(describing the trend toward evidence-based policymaking in the United States and
elsewhere). For a skeptical view on the ability of governments to synthesize and then
translate data into social policy, see Peter Schuck, Why Government Fails So Often: And
How It Can Do Better 161–67 (2014) (describing the challenges with this process,
including the unavailability of data, the competing interpretations of data, and the
uncertainty of how regulated entities will react to social policies).
35. See Ayres, supra note 34, at 29–31 (describing this trend in business and using
the example of Wal-Mart, which deploys data to make virtually every decision); Kristina
McElheran & Erik Brynjolfsson, The Rise of Data-Driven Decision Making Is Real but
Uneven, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://hbr.org/2016/02/the-rise-of-data-drivendecision-making-is-real-but-uneven [http://perma.cc/U9Z7-YR9B] (describing data-driven
decisionmaking in the private sector, using manufacturing as a case study).
36. See, e.g., Annual Letter 2013: Measuring Progress, Bill & Melinda Gates Found.
(Jan. 2013), http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/AnnualLetters-List/Annual-Letter-2013 [http://perma.cc/MQW6-R6U8] (describing a core objective
of the Gates Foundation’s approach to philanthropy as developing effective measurement tools
to ensure that programs are furthering identified goals); Evidence-Based Decision Making,
Laura & John Arnold Found., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/evidence-basedpolicy-innovation/evidence-based-decision-making/ [http://perma.cc/5DLP-VYNY] (last
visited Sept. 27, 2017) (“[M]any of the[] well-intentioned efforts [to address issues such as
hunger, homelessness, and unemployment] have failed to produce adequate improvements.
If we are to solve these problems, we must dramatically accelerate the pace at which we learn
what works and insist on services that deliver measurable results.”).
37. One of the first sectors of the economy to embrace empirical evidence was
medicine. See Shirley Reynolds, The Anatomy of Evidence-Based Practice: Principles and
Methods, in Evidence-Based Practice: A Critical Appraisal 17, 17–22 (Liz Trinder ed.,
2000) (describing the history of evidence-based medicine). An acknowledgement of the
widespread use of empirical evidence entered popular culture through Michael Lewis’s
book about the professional baseball team, the Oakland A’s. See generally Michael Lewis,
Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003).
38. For a discussion of the distinction between evidence used to establish adjudicative
versus legislative facts, see infra text accompanying notes 208–216.
39. See Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No.
107) (available in full on HeinOnline). But see Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and
the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 59, 61–62 (arguing the use
of social science evidence in the courts predated the Brandeis brief). The use of social
science data and methodologies is one of the distinguishing features of the Legal Realist
movement. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1247 (1931) (describing the difficulty of evaluating lower
courts’ actions and noting “the techniques of the social sciences are being drawn upon
and modified to make the work possible”).
40. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (using
cost-benefit analysis to determine negligence); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for
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identifying and adjudicating the reliability of expert testimony.41 And
legal scholars have embraced empirical work across multiple fields,42 with
an entire field of empirical legal studies dedicated to producing, not
simply using, empirical evidence.43
As this Part shows, family law increasingly embraces empirical
evidence as well. Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century,
and accelerating over the past several decades, family law has regularly
drawn on empirical evidence, profoundly changing the process of judging, legislating, and administering the law.44 But as the first section
shows, this was not always the case.
A.

The Historical Baseline

Family autonomy is one of the animating principles at the heart of
family law. When the Supreme Court first held in the early twentieth century that there are limits on the state’s power to interfere with parental
decisionmaking, the Court relied only on the language of rights, not empirical evidence. In a pair of cases, the Court held that, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state cannot unduly
burden the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control.”45 The Court found that
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”46

Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 722–42
(1965) (using economic analysis in the context of accident law).
41. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (setting forth the standard for admission of expert
testimony); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (setting
forth a test for admitting expert testimony that requires evidence to be grounded in
reliable scientific methodology and reasoning and must be relevant to the facts of the
case); Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 §§ 1–2 (2001) (describing
the adoption of the Daubert standard and alternatives in state courts).
42. See Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in
Law, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1195, 1195–97 (2013) (introducing a special issue dedicated to
identifying and exploring the many ways legal scholars and the legal system integrate
empirical evidence across multiple fields).
43. See Society for Empirical Legal Studies, Cornell Univ. Law Sch., http://
www.lawschool.cornell.edu/sels/ [http://perma.cc/MH4L-GJMH] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017)
(describing the society’s purpose, sponsored events, scholarship, and Journal of Empirical
Legal Studies).
44. See infra section I.B.
45. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (establishing a liberty interest in parental control of children’s
education).
46. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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Later in the century, when the Court qualified parental rights by
acknowledging children’s interests, again, it did not cite evidence and
instead relied on perceived common sense. In Parham v. J.R., the Court
held that the law could presume that parents make medical decisions to
further their children’s welfare, and thus children are not constitutionally
entitled to formal adversarial proceedings when parents seek to commit
them to psychiatric hospitals.47 The Court justified this presumption by
claiming that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children”48 and that “pages of human experience . . .
teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests.”49
More broadly, decisionmakers in family law established and justified
legal rules by relying on traditional morality and norms, such as the need
to police sexuality outside marriage and reinforce gender roles within
marriage.50 These values were widely accepted, and decisionmakers did
not generally invoke empirical evidence to support laws furthering these
values and norms.51
Even when the Court was presented with empirical evidence in
family law cases, it often did not rely on it, turning instead to basic values.
In Loving v. Virginia, the state argued the Court should defer to the legislature because there was “conflicting scientific opinion [about] the
effects of interracial marriage, and the desirability of preventing such
alliances, from the physical, biological, genetic, anthropological, cultural,
psychological and sociological point of view.”52 The Court did not
engage with this evidence and instead found that Virginia’s law, which
47. 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979).
48. Id. at 602.
49. Id. at 602–03. The notion that love between parents and children will lead
parents to care for their children has deep roots. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*434–35 (“[P]rovidence has done it more effectually than any laws, by implanting in the
breast of every parent . . . [an] insuperable degree of affection, which not even the
deformity of person or mind, not even the wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of
children, can totally suppress or extinguish.”); 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American
Law 160 (1826) (“The obligation of parental duty is so well secured by the strength of
natural affection, that it seldom requires to be enforced by human laws.”); see also id. at
159 (“The wants and weaknesses of children render it necessary that some person
maintain them, and the voice of nature has pointed out the parent as the most fit and
proper person.”).
50. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1808–19 (1985) (describing moral justification as a
traditional basis for family law).
51. Cf. id. at 1807–19 (describing the historical basis for family regulation—
conventional morality—and the shift away from this grounding since the 1960s).
52. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 7, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 93641. For a description of this aspect of the litigation, see
Linda C. McClain, Prejudice, Moral Progress, and Not Being “On the Wrong Side of
History”: Debating the Legacy of Loving for the Right to Marry 6–15 (Mar. 17, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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restricted intermarriage with whites and not along other racial lines,
could be understood only as an expression of white supremacy and
therefore was invidious racial discrimination.53 Similarly, in Palmore v.
Sidoti—a custody battle between two white parents, with the father challenging the mother’s custody because her new husband was Black—the
Court was uninterested in whether a child raised by an interracial couple
might suffer stigma and harm; instead, the Court focused on the
importance of race-neutral decisionmaking.54
Outside of constitutional law, courts also relied on common sense
and traditional norms, not empirical evidence. For instance, the spousal
immunity privilege permits a spouse to refuse to provide adverse testimony in a criminal trial of the other spouse,55 and the marital
communications privilege protects confidential communications between
spouses.56 Courts justified these privileges by claiming that they promote
marital harmony and solidarity.57 But courts did not cite any evidence to
support the contention that testifying against each other or breaching
marital confidences would introduce strife and distrust into marriage.58
Instead, courts relied on common sense and traditional notions of
marriage.59

53. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
54. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The question, however, is whether the reality of
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty
concluding that they are not.”).
55. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (“[T]he witness-spouse
alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to
testify nor foreclosed from testifying.”). There are numerous nuances not relevant here,
such as the differences between federal and state law. For details, see Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2045, 2052–55 (1995).
56. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 334 (1951) (holding a defendant’s refusal
to reveal his wife’s location, which she may have confidentially shared with him, was
lawful); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (noting the “basis of the immunity
given to communications between husband and wife is the protection of marital
confidences”). For a discussion of both spousal privileges, see Dan Markel et al., Criminal
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1147, 1168–69.
57. See Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (stating the marital communications privilege was
“regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh
the disadvantages to the administration of justice”); United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d
313, 315 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting the spousal immunity privilege “preserve[s] family peace
by preventing husband and wife from becoming adversaries in a criminal proceeding”).
58. See, e.g., Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (citing the reasoning for the privilege but
providing no supporting evidence to suggest that it is necessary to preserve marital
harmony).
59. In Trammel, the Court reasoned that “[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify
against the other in a criminal proceeding . . . their relationship is almost certainly in
disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to
preserve.” Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
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When legal actors did invoke empirical evidence, it was generally
pseudoscience. Consider the odious history of sterilization programs.
From 1929 to 1975, North Carolina sterilized approximately 7,600
people,60 targeting low-income women of color and people with low IQ
test scores or low levels of education.61 Programs like this were justified
by the “science” of phrenology and the like, purportedly proving the
inferiority of people of color and low-income populations.62
In sum, the traditional mode of analysis and the justification for
legal rules was not empirical, at least as we understand the term today. As
the next section describes, this absence of empirical evidence did not
last.
B.

Empirical Evidence Across the Institutions of Family Law

In stark contrast to the historical baseline, empirical analysis in
family law is now widespread. This trend is consistent with the
empiricization of law generally, but it also responds to a particular
demand in family law. In the last part of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court largely rejected traditional morality and dominant norms
as acceptable justifications for family law.63 It was thus necessary to find
new justifications for the regulation of families, creating an opening for
empirical evidence. Additionally, as family norms rapidly changed during
the same period—including an increase in divorce, a rise in
cohabitation, and more childbearing outside of marriage64—societal
consensus about family values began to wane.65 Empirical evidence thus
appealed as a seemingly neutral basis for decisionmaking. Responding to
these changes, courts and legislatures embraced empirical evidence, with
psychological theories about parents and children fundamentally shaping

60. Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human
Heredity 92–94 (1985); Adam Owens, N.C. Dedicates Marker to Eugenics Program, WRAL
(June 22, 2009), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/5406081/ [http://perma.cc/
HP3U-9PYQ]; Victims of State Sterilization Tell Their Stories, WRAL (June 30, 2011),
http://www.wral.com/news/video/9755940/#/vid9755940 [http://perma.cc/YV4Z-8YAX].
61. Clarence J. Gamble, Eugenic Sterilization in North Carolina, 12 N.C. Med. J. 550,
550–51 (1951).
62. See Robert V. Guthrie, Even the Rat Was White: A Historical View of Psychology
92–104 (1976); Kevles, supra note 60, at 92–94.
63. For two, among many, such decisions, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461–65
(1988) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for statutory distinctions based on the marital
status of parents and discussing earlier cases suggesting heightened scrutiny was warranted
for classifications based on illegitimacy); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281–83 (1979) (striking
down a state statute authorizing the award of alimony for only women, not men).
64. See Clare Huntington, Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family
Relationships 28–31 (2014) [hereinafter Huntington, Failure to Flourish] (describing
these changes).
65. See Cahn, supra note 19, at 227–29, 236–49.

2018]

THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW

241

child custody laws66 and research on child abuse leading to mandatory
reporting laws and the modern child welfare system.67
This section describes the empirical turn in three contexts:
litigation, legislation, and administration. As this section shows, both the
type and quality of empirical evidence vary. Decisionmakers use evidence
from the hard sciences, demographic statistics about changes in family
form, and social science studies about the relationship between those
changes and child outcomes. Some empirical evidence satisfies scientific
standards for reliability, but other evidence decidedly does not. Although
the empirical turn reaches across all of family law, this section describes it
in detail in the context of litigation, with a particular focus on the
marriage equality cases. This fine-grained description of the marriage
equality litigation lays the groundwork for the critique of empirical
evidence in Part II and the proposed framework in Part III.
1. Litigation
a. Marriage Equality. — In the early days of the marriage equality
movement,68 the debate did not focus on children.69 In the 1980s,
66. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156–58 (Iowa 1966) (reviewing the
social science literature and drawing on the then-dominant theory of psychological
parenthood to determine that the child’s best interests would be served by remaining in
the care of his grandparents, with whom the child had lived for nearly three years, rather
than the biological father); Davis, There Is a Book Out, supra note 11, at 1542–47
(describing how social science research influenced the best-interests standard beginning
in the 1960s).
67. C. Henry Kempe, et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 17,
23 (1962) (describing the results of a national study of injured children and defining a
new diagnosis—Battered Child Syndrome); Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from
Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53
Hastings L.J. 1, 55–60 (2001) (describing the Battered Child Syndrome study and its
pivotal role in the creation of the modern child welfare system). Another pioneer was
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was an early advocate for using social science to inform
government policy. See James T. Patterson, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Moynihan
Report and America’s Struggle over Black Family Life—From LBJ to Obama 14 (2010)
(describing Moynihan’s efforts to “put into practice his faith in the capacity of expert
social scientists to fashion public policy”). Some examples of influential empirical
evidence in family law over the succeeding decades include the work of Professors Martha
Fineman and Robert Mnookin. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of Equality:
The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 18–20, 32–33, 55, 61–73 (1991) (describing
the negative effect of no-fault divorce on women); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer 1975, at 226, 229–30 (documenting the inconsistent, unpredictable, and
undesirable consequences of the best-interests standard in child welfare and child custody
cases).
68. See Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 87, 117–46 (2014)
(arguing that even before advocates began making explicit and sustained claims for
marriage in the 1990s, marriage still shaped the battle for relationship recognition—
domestic partnerships and civil unions—with advocates patterning these models of
relationship recognition on marriage).
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however, a significant number of lesbians had begun to conceive
children and raise them with a partner,70 and advocates began to argue

This Essay focuses on the marriage equality litigation as an example of the
importance of empirical evidence in LGBT family rights because the issue had such
widespread social salience. But the evidentiary battle played out in related cases as well,
such as litigation over the adoption rights of LGBT adults. These cases had many of the
same hallmarks. For example, in a federal case challenging Florida’s ban on adoption by
“homosexuals,” Fla. Stat. § 63.042(3) (2014) (amended 2015), the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the state law, finding that the State Legislature could rationally conclude that the
ban was necessary because there was no conclusive evidence that children do not benefit
from growing up with two different-sex, married parents. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 825 (11th Cir. 2004). The court stated:
[W]e must ask not whether the latest in social science research and professional
opinion support the decision of the Florida legislature, but whether that evidence
is so well established and so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational for the
Florida legislature to believe that the interests of its children are best served by
not permitting homosexual adoption.
Id. The court also noted the absence of longitudinal studies following subjects into
adulthood, concluding that the Legislature could find the relevant research insufficiently
developed to rely upon, see id. at 826, and that “the question of the effects of homosexual
parenting . . . is one on which even experts of good faith reasonably disagree,” id. The
court determined that the Legislature could rationally rely on the “unprovable
assumption” that a married man and woman is the “optimal social structure” for
childrearing, and thus, the State could prefer this family structure to others in the context
of adoption. Id. at 819–20, 826.
Six years later, the Florida District Court of Appeal struck down the adoption ban,
relying heavily on empirical evidence. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of
X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 91–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The court referred to the trial
court’s finding that rigorous research, including longitudinal studies that followed
participants for up to fourteen years, demonstrated no difference between parenting by
LGBT and heterosexual parents and no difference in the adjustment of children raised by
same-sex and different-sex parents. See id. at 86–87. The trial court had closely examined
the evidence, rejecting one expert’s analysis of social science studies because other experts
testified that the analysis had fundamental errors and most of the scientific community
disagreed with the analysis. See id. at 88. The trial court also rejected expert testimony that
LGBT adults have a higher lifetime prevalence of certain mood and substance disorders,
concluding that if every demographic group with elevated rates of these disorders was
excluded from adopting, then only Asian American men would be allowed to adopt. See
id. at 89.
69. See NeJaime, supra note 68, at 117–21, 151 (describing the arguments made for
and against relationship recognition, which centered primarily on the intimate bond
between partners and their economic interdependency, and further noting that social
conservatives were worried about the impact of domestic partnerships on the traditional
definition of marriage).
70. See George Chauncey, Why Marriage? The History Shaping Today’s Debate over
Gay Equality 105 (2004) (“[T]he lesbian baby boom of the 1980s represented something
new: a generation of women who lived openly as lesbians and no longer felt obliged to
marry a man in order to have a child.”).
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that same-sex relationships should be recognized to help protect the
children.71
With LGBT parenting as a central component of the marriage
equality movement, advocates on both sides began to make arguments
about the quality of that parenting.72 Advocates had a ready source of
social scientific evidence—studies on LGBT parenting that had been
conducted in response to custody battles in the 1970s.73 At first,
opponents of marriage equality argued that LGBT parents harmed their
children.74 Over time, this argument morphed into a claim that even if
children were not actively harmed, the optimal childrearing environment
for a child was with two different-sex, married parents.75
After the Supreme Court held in 2003 that the State could not
reflexively draw on traditional values to regulate lesbians and gay men, at
least in criminal law,76 the focus on empirical evidence became all the
more important. The state needed to show a reason, beyond moral
71. Id. Many LGBT parents were already raising children, but they were generally
raising children conceived in previous different-sex relationships. Id. The change in the
1980s was that lesbians began conceiving children within same-sex relationships. Id.
72. This began with the litigation in Hawaii. Addressing a challenge to the
constitutionality of the State’s law, Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572-1 (LexisNexis 2015), the
Hawaii Supreme Court found the law discriminated on the basis of sex and therefore was
subject to heightened scrutiny. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65–66 (Haw. 1993). The
court remanded the case to allow the State to introduce evidence to satisfy this standard.
In a bench trial, the plaintiffs presented expert witnesses to testify about the effects of
same-sex parenting on child development. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235, at *10–16 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), rev’d mem., 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
The trial court found that the testimony presented by two experts for the plaintiffs, a
sociologist and a psychologist, was “especially credible,” id. at *10, and that the State had
not produced sufficient evidence to establish adverse public consequences from allowing
same-sex couples to marry or that traditional marriage needed to be protected, see id. at
*16–17. After noting that the evidence indicated that the most important factor in child
development was the quality of the parent–child relationship, the court concluded that
sexual orientation is not an indicator of parental fitness. See id. at *17.
73. Marie-Amélie George, The Custody Crucible: The Development of Scientific
Authority About Gay and Lesbian Parents, 34 Law & Hist. Rev. 487, 493–99 (2016)
(describing cases in which courts were deciding whether to award custody to the
heterosexual parent or the parent who had begun a relationship with a same-sex partner).
74. Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal
Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 403, 408 (2009) (“This
argument, which I call the ‘gays make bad parents’ argument, was embraced in some form
by all three appellate courts that heard challenges to prohibitions against same-sex
marriages in the 1970s.”).
75. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (crediting the
argument that “it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a
mother and a father”).
76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (noting that “for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral” but that “[t]he
issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the
whole society through operation of the criminal law”).
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judgments, for keeping same-sex couples out of marriage. Ultimately,
opponents of marriage equality abandoned the comparative argument
about same-sex parents and different-sex parents entirely and instead
cited a new outcomes-based justification for the restriction: that the state
had an interest in channeling procreative sex into marriage to ensure a
child had two parents, and thus the state could privilege different-sex
marriage as a way of inducing these couples to marry.77
Advocates of marriage equality made their own empirically
grounded claims. Citing demographic evidence, they demonstrated that
same-sex couples were raising children in increasing numbers.78 Drawing
on social science evidence, they argued that children raised by same-sex
couples have similar outcomes to children raised by different-sex
couples.79 Relying on economic and social science evidence, they contended that marriage provides economic and emotional stability to
children.80 And, finally, looking to social science research, advocates
posited that children raised by same-sex couples would benefit from their
parents’ access to marriage.81
Some courts were skeptical about the relevance of this empirical
evidence, especially early in the movement. In the state court litigation
over New York’s marriage restriction,82 the Court of Appeals applied
rational basis review and found the different-sex requirement did not
violate the state constitution.83 In a plurality opinion, the court invoked
family law’s traditional methodology, relying on “the undisputed
assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of children.”84 On
this basis, the court held that the Legislature could rationally decide that
different-sex couples are far more likely than same-sex couples to
procreate and could seek to stabilize these families to channel
procreation into marriage.85 The court likewise held that the Legislature
could rationally conclude that it is better for a child to grow up with a man
77. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing the prevention
of nonmarital childbearing as the sole argument advanced by Indiana); Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“The primary rationale Proponents offer for Proposition 8
is that it advances California’s interest in responsible procreation and childrearing.”).
78. See infra note 202.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 97, 112. For a summary of the underlying
studies, see Carlos A. Ball, Social Science Studies and the Children of Lesbians and Gay
Men: The Rational Basis Perspective, 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 691, 702–15 (2013).
80. See infra text accompanying note 97.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 97–98, 112.
82. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006) (describing the history of
this litigation and noting that the trial courts in four cases granted summary judgment,
one in favor of the plaintiffs challenging the New York law and three in favor of the State).
83. See id. at 9–12.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
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and a woman as the two parents.86 The court cited no evidence, instead
stating that “[i]ntuition and experience suggest that a child benefits
from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both
a man and a woman are like.”87 In response to the plaintiffs’ argument
that the optimal childrearing proposition was factually untrue, the court
dismissed any social science evidence as inconclusive, and thus “the
Legislature could rationally think otherwise.”88
In many other cases, however, the empirical evidence played a
critical role.89 Often courts considered this evidence at summary judgment,90 but in two of the three cases that made it to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the trial court conducted lengthy trials, developing a rich factual
record that largely turned on empirical evidence.91 In the first such case,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the federal challenge to California’s constitutional
amendment limiting marriage to different-sex couples,92 the trial court
held a twelve-day bench proceeding.93 The effect on child outcomes of

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 7–8 (“[T]he studies . . . do not establish beyond doubt that children fare
equally well in same-sex and opposite-sex households . . . . In the absence of conclusive
scientific evidence, the Legislature could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise
that children will do best with a mother and father in the home.”).
89. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896, 899–901 (Iowa 2009) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to Iowa’s marriage restriction and concluding that the governmental
justification that different-sex parents provide children with the optimal childrearing
environment did not pass). In one of the final lower court decisions striking down
different-sex marriage requirements, Judge Posner eviscerated arguments made by
Indiana and Wisconsin in support of their marriage restrictions: He concluded that “more
than unsupported conjecture that same-sex marriage will harm heterosexual marriage or
children or any other valid and important interest of a state is necessary to justify
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.” Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th
Cir. 2014). Indeed, he found that “the grounds advanced by Indiana and Wisconsin for
their discriminatory policies are not only conjectural; they are totally implausible.” Id.
90. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 899 (citing the “abundance of evidence and
research . . . supporting the proposition that the interests of children are served equally by
same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents” and noting that the “opinions that dualgender parenting is the optimal environment for children” are “largely unsupported by
reliable scientific studies”).
91. This section discusses the trials in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
929 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), and
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761–68 (E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.
2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). The trial court in
Windsor v. United States did not conduct a trial and instead granted summary judgment to
the plaintiff. See 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012),
aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
92. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California.”), ruled unconstitutional in Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921.
93. See 704 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
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being raised by two married, different-sex parents was a central issue in
the litigation.94
The trial was largely a battle of experts. The plaintiffs produced nine
experts, and the defendants produced two.95 The plaintiffs’ experts
included two historians; one testified about the historical meaning of
marriage, and the other put California’s constitutional amendment in
the historical context of discrimination against LGBT people.96 Three
psychologists were called to testify: one about the evidence on LGBT
parenting, one about the physical and economic benefits of marriage,
and one about the nature of sexual orientation.97 Two economists
weighed in on the economic benefits to a state flowing from marriage as
compared with domestic partnerships and the economic benefits of
marriage to the couple.98 A social epidemiologist testified about the
increased risk of physical and mental harms for gays and lesbians as a
result of the constitutional amendment.99 And a political scientist
testified about the extent to which homophobia infects the political
process.100 In response, proponents101 of the ballot initiative that led to
the constitutional amendment introduced the founder and president of
the Institute for American Values; opining as an expert, he testified
about marriage, fatherhood, and family structure, contending that
children do best when raised by married, biological parents.102
The trial court engaged in a lengthy analysis of this empirical
evidence. The court dissected the methodological and substantive
components of the underlying social science, focusing on sample size,

94. In proposing the amendment to the state constitution, the ballot initiative
contained this explanatory language in favor of the amendment: “[T]he best situation for
a child is to be raised by a married mother and father.” Ron Prentice et al., Argument in
Favor of Proposition 8, in California General Election: Official Voter Information Guide,
General Election Ballot 56 (2008), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdf-guide/vignov-2008-principal.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9PQ-HXYE]. At trial, the defendants continued
this line of argument, contending that limiting marriage to different-sex couples
“[p]romotes ‘statistically optimal’ child-rearing households; that is, households in which
children are raised by a man and a woman married to each other.” Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d
at 931 (quoting defendants’ written submissions).
95. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 932.
96. See id. at 933–37.
97. See id. at 934–36.
98. See id. at 934–36, 938.
99. See id. at 935–36.
100. See id. at 937.
101. The plaintiffs had sued the Governor and Attorney General of California as well
as several other government officials, but none of the defendants was willing to defend the
constitutional amendment. Id. at 928. Thus, five proponents of the constitutional
amendment argued in favor of the amendment. See id. at 928, 954.
102. Id. at 945–50. The proponents also introduced a political science expert, who
testified about the political power of LGBT people in California. See id. at 950–52.
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replicability, and so on.103 The court readily accepted the plaintiffs’ expert testimony,104 but it found that the opinions of the proponents’
experts were “not supported by reliable evidence or methodology” and
therefore were “entitled to essentially no weight.”105
This evidentiary battle was dispositive in the resulting decision, with
the court concluding that “[t]he trial evidence provides no basis for
establishing that California has an interest in refusing to recognize
marriage between two people because of their sex”106 and that “the
evidence presented at trial fatally undermines the premises underlying
proponents’ proffered rationales for” the constitutional amendment.107
Speaking directly to the question of LGBT parenting, the court found
that “[c]hildren raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children
raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted.
The research supporting this conclusion is accepted beyond serious
debate in the field of developmental psychology.”108 The court thus
concluded that California’s different-sex limitation on marriage violated
both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.109
The nine-day bench trial challenging Michigan’s constitutional
amendment,110 DeBoer v. Snyder, was similarly replete with expert testimony and debates about methodology, sample sizes, and correlation

103. The court noted, for example, that the studies finding that married different-sex
parents provide the optimal childrearing environment did not explore the outcomes for
children raised in a stable same-sex household, id. at 935, and thus these studies “do not
inform conclusions about outcomes for children raised by same-sex parents in stable, longterm relationships,” id. at 981.
104. See id. at 940–44.
105. Id. at 950; see also id. at 947, 952.
106. Id. at 934.
107. Id. at 938. The trial court required only some evidence to support the
constitutional amendment: “An initiative measure adopted by the voters deserves great
respect. The considered views and opinions of even the most highly qualified scholars and
experts seldom outweigh the determinations of the voters. When challenged, however, the
voters’ determinations must find at least some support in evidence.” Id.
108. Id. at 980. The trial court made eighty findings of fact, including that children
raised by same-sex parents benefit economically and psychologically when their parents
are able to marry, see id. at 973, that the gender and sexual orientation of the parent do
not affect child outcomes, see id. at 980, and that having two different-sex parents does
not increase the likelihood a child will have positive life outcomes, see id. at 981.
109. See id. at 991–1003.
110. Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 (“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our
society and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in
marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose.”); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that the trial
court “held a nine-day trial on the issue”), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015).
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versus causation.111 The plaintiffs introduced empirical evidence about
families headed by same-sex parents, academic achievement for children
raised by same-sex couples, an ongoing study about relationship stability,
and so on.112 Defendants introduced competing empirical evidence on
the same subjects.113 As in Perry, the trial court meticulously scrutinized
this empirical evidence. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’
studies used convenience samples—small, self-selected populations
rather than large, representative samples—but noted that this was the
standard methodology in the relevant fields.114 By contrast, the court
criticized the defendants’ evidence because it compared children who
had not experienced a family breakup with those who had; the court
noted that the comparison should be between children raised in stable
homes with different-sex parents and children raised in stable homes
with same-sex parents.115 The court further found that one of the central
studies relied upon by the defendants had been funded by a party who
was certain the study would show the value of different-sex marriage,
which undermined the credibility of the study.116 For these reasons, the
court found the testimony of the defendants’ experts “entirely
unbelievable and not worthy of serious consideration.”117
This empirical evidence was critical to the court’s ruling, with the
court concluding that the Michigan constitutional amendment could not
even pass the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause.118
The court rejected all of the State’s rationales,119 including the argument
that married different-sex parents provide the optimal environment for
raising children. The court found that there was no evidence that
children benefit from being raised by married different-sex parents and

111. 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388, rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. As in California, the plaintiffs in the Michigan litigation
contended that the limitation violated the federal Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause. See id. at 760. Michigan defended the provision by arguing that it
served four legitimate purposes: giving children “‘biologically connected’ role models of
both genders that are necessary to foster healthy psychological development,” “avoiding
the unintended consequences that might result from redefining marriage,” “upholding
tradition and morality,” and channeling procreation into stable relationships. See id. The
court assumed the standard of review was rational basis. See id. at 760–61.
112. See id. at 761–64.
113. See id. at 765–67.
114. See id. at 761–62.
115. See id. at 765.
116. See id. at 766.
117. Id. at 766–68. The trial court found the testimony of all three experts “clearly
represent[s] a fringe viewpoint that is rejected by the vast majority of their colleagues
across a variety of social science fields.” Id. at 768.
118. See id. at 768–69. In light of the holding on equal protection grounds, the court
declined to address the due process argument. See id. at 768.
119. See id. at 770.
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that even if it were true, carrying this argument to its logical conclusion
would lead the State to restrict marriage for demographic groups that are
correlated with poor outcomes for children, such as minority and lowincome families, a proposition the court called an “absurdity.”120
By the time marriage equality came before the U.S. Supreme Court,
the empirical decisionmaking in the lower courts had largely settled the
question about same-sex parenting and child outcomes, and there was no
reason to rehash the debate.121 It is unsurprising, then, that the Court’s
opinion in Obergefell did not mention the underlying evidence on samesex parenting and instead waxed poetic about the importance of
marriage.122 Even though it was not at the forefront of the decision,
however, it is likely that the empirical evidence played a role. It is hard to
imagine the Court, and Justice Kennedy in particular, approving
marriage equality if there were evidence that this family form harmed
children.

120. Id. at 770–72.
121. Indeed, the defenders of the different-sex requirement did not make evidence on
same-sex parenting a central issue. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners at 31–48, Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 457384 [hereinafter Perry Petitioners
Brief]. Instead, they relied on other arguments, notably that the state has a particular
interest in channeling procreative sex into marriage, that caution counsels in favor of a goslow approach, and that the issue should be left to the democratic process. See, e.g., Brief
for Respondent at 11–35, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015
WL 1384100; Perry Petitioners Brief, supra, at 31–61.
In Perry, at least some of the Justices wanted to revisit the empirical question. At oral
argument, for example, Justice Scalia noted that “there’s considerable disagreement
among . . . sociologists as to what the consequences [are] of raising a child in a . . . singlesex family, [and] whether that is harmful to the child or not,” see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 19, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 6908183, and “that there’s
no scientific answer to that question at this point in time,” see id. at 20. Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that the “sociological information is new” but that the Court should focus
on the injury to the children of same-sex parents. See id. at 21. The case was ultimately
decided on jurisdictional grounds, see Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668, so the opinion did not
mention the evidence.
In Obergefell v. Hodges, although some amici addressed the empirical evidence directly,
see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Sociological Association in Support of
Petitioners at 5–27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1048442 (discussing
the empirical evidence at length); Brief of Amici Curiae the Ruth Institute and Dr.
Jennifer Roback Morse, PhD, in Support of Respondents and in Opposition to Reversal at
21–29, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1501656 (same), neither the
parties nor the Court addressed it in any detail, and it was mentioned only in passing at
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14556), 2015 WL 2399419 (documenting an exchange between Justice Scalia and Solicitor
General Donald Verilli about whether “all of the evidence shows there is no problem” with
same-sex couples raising children).
122. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (describing marriage as “a keystone of our social
order”); see also id. at 2594, 2608 (arguing marriage “embodies the highest ideals of . . .
family” and “is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations”).
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b. Abortion. — Empirical evidence has also played a key role in
abortion jurisprudence. The basic liberty right of a woman to decide
whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy rests on notions of privacy
and individual liberty,123 but empirical evidence has long been pivotal in
decisions recognizing and effectuating this right.124 Empirical evidence
has taken on even greater importance since 1992, when the test to
determine the constitutionality of an abortion regulation became
whether the restriction imposes an “undue burden” on the right to
reproductive freedom.125 This is fundamentally an empirical inquiry,
centered on whether the purpose or effect of the restriction creates a
substantial obstacle to exercising the right.126
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court pored over evidence
about the state restrictions, notably the requirement that doctors
performing abortions have admitting privileges in nearby hospitals.127
The Court described the trial evidence—both expert testimony and peerreviewed medical studies—finding that abortions are a safe procedure
and that hospital admissions are rare.128 The Court also considered the
extensive evidence introduced at trial that the requirement had led to
the closure of half of the abortion facilities in Texas.129 Based on this

123. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This
right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”).
124. In Roe v. Wade, the Court compared data on mortality rates from early-pregnancy
abortions and childbirth to establish that maternal mortality rates for abortions performed
before the end of the first trimester are “as low as or lower than the rates for normal
childbirth,” 410 U.S. at 149, and the viability test established in the case rests on a
scientific understanding of fetal development, see id. at 163 (explaining the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the life of the fetus at the point of the viability “because
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb”). For another example, see Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 76–79 (1976) (invalidating a state ban on a procedure using saline amniocentesis
by relying on data comparing the use of this procedure and alternative procedures).
125. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–77.
126. See id. (“[A] statute which, while furthering . . . [a] valid state interest, has the
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”); id. at 878 (“Unnecessary
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”).
127. See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–11 (2016); see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 171.0031(a) (West 2017) (“A physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on
the date the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting privileges at a
hospital that . . . is located not further than 30 miles from the location at which the
abortion is performed or induced.”).
128. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–11.
129. See id. at 2312.
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evidence, the Court concluded that the requirement imposed a
substantial obstacle to the exercise of the right.130
In another abortion case, the Supreme Court also relied on
empirical evidence—albeit much more questionable evidence—to draw
conclusions about the mental health consequences of an abortion. In
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court held that it was permissible for a state to
prohibit a medical procedure, in part because there was evidence that
after an abortion “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow.”131
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy cited an amicus brief
representing the views of 181 women who had had an abortion and who
felt that the procedure created “adverse emotional and psychological
health effects.”132 This brief also cited to a South Dakota task force that
purportedly established the detrimental mental health effects of an
abortion.133
As this last example demonstrates, judicial reliance on empirical
evidence is not inevitably a neutral or thorough process. Indeed, in
Carhart the parties had not extensively litigated the mental health effects
of abortions in the two-week bench trial in the case.134 If they had, the
challengers likely would have introduced the abundant evidence finding

130. See id. at 2311–12. The other state restriction at issue in the case required
facilities providing abortions to meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers. In
finding that the requirement did not promote women’s health, was unnecessary, and
placed a substantial obstacle to exercising the right to reproductive choice, the Court
credited expert testimony at trial predicting the closure of clinics, finding that although
the prediction was not ultimately borne out, it had relied on the “scientific method” of
making a hypothesis and then attempting to verify the hypothesis with further studies. See
id. at 2314–17.
131. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citing Brief for Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe”
of Doe v. Bolton, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22–24, Carhart, 550 U.S.
124 (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684 [hereinafter Sandra Cano Brief]). Another reason for
prohibiting the procedure was that a woman might later regret her decision to terminate a
pregnancy once she found out the details of the procedure. See id. (“[S]ome women
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”); see
also id. at 159–60 (“It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort
must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns . . .
that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her
unborn child . . . .”). The Court acknowledged that there was no evidence to support this
regret rationale. See id. at 159 (“While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”).
132. Sandra Cano Brief, supra note 131, at 1.
133. See id. at 16–21. For a discussion of the task force, see infra text accompanying
notes 291–294.
134. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 852–1002 (D. Neb. 2004)
(summarizing the medical evidence at trial but noting the psychological effects of
abortion only in passing), aff’d sub nom. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir.
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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that abortions are not correlated with mental health problems,135 and the
Supreme Court would have had to grapple with this more complete
evidentiary record. The discussion below returns to the issue of selective
use of empirical evidence.136
c. Intimate Partner Violence and the Child Welfare System. — Empirical
evidence was also a decisive factor in a significant rights-based case that
significantly affected the child welfare system—the litigation over New
York City’s practice of responding to intimate partner violence by
removing children from their homes and placing them in foster care.137
In a class action challenging the practice, the district court held a twentyfour-day bench trial, with twelve expert witnesses.138 These witnesses
addressed the research on children and intimate partner violence,
focusing on whether witnessing intimate partner violence produced
adverse effects for children and whether a home with intimate partner
violence was more likely to be a home with child abuse.139 The experts
also described the research on the detrimental effects of removal on

135. See Brenda Major et al., Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Report of the APA Task Force on Mental
Health and Abortion 4–5 (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mentalhealth.pdf [http://perma.cc/LN5J-H76C] (“[A]mong adult women who have an
unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is no greater if they have a
single elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver that pregnancy. The evidence
regarding the relative mental health risks associated with multiple abortions is more
equivocal.”).
136. See infra section II.B.2.
137. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 208–10, 228–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(describing the city’s practice of finding that a victim of intimate partner violence was
neglecting the child). The city persisted in this practice even when the child had not
witnessed the violence firsthand, when the child was not the direct victim of the abuse, and
when the mother was otherwise adequately caring for the child. See id. at 169–72, 228. For
a firsthand account of the litigation from the perspective of the plaintiffs’ attorney, see
generally Jill M. Zuccardy, Nicholson v. Williams: The Case, 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 655 (2005).
138. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 165; Zuccardy, supra note 137, at 662 (noting that
the trial included twelve expert witnesses).
139. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 197–98. Drawing on extensive studies and their
own work, five experts offered the following opinions: Children experience a range of
negative effects, from minor psychological disturbance to post-traumatic stress syndrome;
numerous factors influence a child’s reaction including the severity of the abuse, the
child’s proximity to the abuse, and the parent’s ability to support the child; witnessing
domestic violence is correlated with a higher risk of substance abuse and violence as an
adult, but the vast majority of children exposed to intimate partner violence do not
experience these problems as an adult; and even when children are exposed to severe
intimate partner violence, if they are then in a safe place and the violence ends, significant
psychological problems disappear completely for the majority of children. See id.
Plaintiffs’ experts testified that although intimate partner violence and child abuse often
occur together, it is almost always the same adult inflicting both kinds of abuse—it is not
typically a situation in which the father hits a mother who then hits the child. See id. at
198.
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children, especially in cases of intimate partner violence,140 and the best
practices for addressing intimate partner violence in the child welfare
system.141
Relying extensively on the expert testimony, the district court ruled
that the city’s practice was unconstitutional.142 Although the decision was
subsequently narrowed on appeal,143 the decision continues to resonate
across the child welfare system.144 Moreover, there is no question that
that empirical evidence was critical to the outcome of the case.145
d. Juvenile Sentencing. — Empirical evidence has had a profound
effect on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In a series of cases
addressing the constitutionality of sentences for crimes committed by
juveniles, the Supreme Court relied heavily on research in the fields of
neuroscience, psychology, and sociology.146 The underlying research
140. Id. at 198–99. The experts noted that removing a child from the home, and thus
disrupting the parent–child relationship, can have extreme consequences for the child’s
sense of security and safety and that when the child has been removed because of intimate
partner violence, the child’s sense of danger is often heightened because the child is
concerned about the parent left behind. Id. Further, the experts testified that children
often blame themselves for the removal, leading to psychological problems, and
placement in foster care introduces a new set of risks, including abuse and neglect,
inadequate medical care, and disruption of the child’s contacts with family, school, and
community. Id. at 199.
141. Id. at 200–05 (describing extensive expert testimony and a report by the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges). This evidence suggested to the court that
mothers should not be accused of neglect merely for being victims of domestic violence,
perpetrators should be held accountable, children should be protected by offering
services to the mother, removal should be used only as a last resort, and child welfare
workers should be adequately trained on the dynamics of these cases. See id.
142. See id. at 233–60 (finding a likelihood of success on the merits for the plaintiffs’
Fourth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Nineteenth Amendment claims and thus
issuing a preliminary injunction).
143. The case had a lengthy subsequent history not relevant to the issue of how courts
use empirical evidence. For a discussion of this history, see Zuccardy, supra note 137, at
669.
144. See Kathleen A. Copps, The Good, the Bad, and the Future of Nicholson v.
Scoppetta: An Analysis of the Effects and Suggestions for Further Improvements, 72 Alb. L.
Rev. 497, 510–12, 523–25 (2009) (describing the changes in New York City as a result of
the litigation and cataloguing the decision’s influence in other jurisdictions).
145. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 198–99, 250 (reviewing expert testimony about
the harm of removing children from their homes even when there is domestic violence in
the home and concluding that “[t]he evidence demonstrates that the compelling state
interest in protecting children” is hindered by “policies of prosecuting abused mothers
and removing their children”).
146. For a small sample of this literature, see, e.g., Alison S. Burke, Under
Construction: Brain Formation, Culpability, and the Criminal Justice System, 34 Int’l J.L.
& Psychiatry 381, 382–83 (2011) (presenting neuroscience research indicating “the brain
is still growing and maturing during adolescence” and arguing that charging children as
adults is overly punitive); Eveline A. Crone & Maurits W. van der Molen, Developmental
Changes in Real Life Decision Making: Performance on a Gambling Task Previously
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shows that, although brain structure is primarily in place by age five or
six, the brain continues to develop through early adulthood. Neuroscientists have focused in particular on the prefrontal cortex, finding that
adolescents have less forethought and impulse control than fully
matured adults.147 Additionally, adolescents are still developing their
characters and personalities, and there are many opportunities for
change and growth.148
Working with scholars in other disciplines, legal scholars played a
pivotal role in translating this research into legal rules and principles.149
One of the most productive collaborations was between legal scholar
Elizabeth Scott and psychologist Laurence Steinberg. In a highly
influential article, Scott and Steinberg laid out a framework for a developmentally sensitive approach to juvenile justice.150 They contended that
developmental insights should inform the approach to juvenile crime:
The immaturity of adolescents means they are not as morally culpable,
their vulnerability to peer pressure makes it difficult for adolescents to
leave a situation in which a crime may be committed, and their stilldeveloping characters means there is an opportunity for rehabilitation.151
Shown to Depend on the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 25 Developmental
Neuropsychology 251, 252 (2004) (presenting research indicating juvenile brains do not
fully appreciate future consequences); Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance
Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 77, 83 (2004) (noting
research indicating important brain functions that “inhibit impulses, weigh consequences
of decisions, prioritize, and strategize” are “still under construction for a decade after the
throes of puberty and may therefore be related to some of the behavioral manifestations
of the teen years”); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical
Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci.
8174, 8174, 8178 (2004) (mapping brain development over time and noting that regions
associated with more complex and integrative tasks developed last).
147. See Burke, supra note 146, at 382–83 (“Research shows that youths also have a
less than fully developed brain and this difference can account for many behavioral
discrepancies between adolescents and adults. Because the brain is still forming and
changing during the teenage years, the culpability of adolescent behavior may be
diminished.”); Crone & van der Molen, supra note 146, at 274 (noting that study
participants, with advancing age, “made increasingly more advantageous choices”); Giedd,
supra note 146, at 83 (concluding that “brain structure goes through explosive changes
during the teen years”).
148. See Laurence Steinberg, Age of Opportunity: Lessons from the New Science of
Adolescence 18–64 (2014) (arguing that adolescence is a “remarkable period of brain
reorganization and plasticity”).
149. See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 Law & Ineq.
263, 277–83 (2013) (reviewing the legal literature, which heavily draws on the underlying
interdisciplinary research).
150. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003).
151. See id.

2018]

THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW

255

Starting with Roper v. Simmons in 2005,152 and through the most
recent pronouncement in Montgomery v. Louisiana in 2016,153 the Court
drew heavily on the underlying research. The Court embraced the
developmentally sensitive framework proposed by Scott and Steinberg,154
holding that the Eighth Amendment places substantial constraints on
sentences for crimes committed by minors.155
e. Child Custody. — Finally, empirical evidence is playing an
influential role in contemporary custody decisions. In custody disputes
between parents, every state uses some variant of the best-interests-of-thechild standard,156 which itself was shaped by empirical evidence.157 This
test gives nearly boundless discretion to the court.158 As scholars have
shown,159 courts are ill-equipped to implement this standard, and thus
courts look to more definite criteria, such as each parent’s willingness
and ability to foster a relationship between the child and the other
parent.160
To determine a parent’s openness to the child’s ongoing
relationship with the other parent, some courts have relied on so-called
parental alienation syndrome.161 Developed by a single psychologist
152. 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
153. 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016).
154. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
155. See id. at 578 (holding it unconstitutional to impose the death penalty upon a
seventeen-year-old minor who committed first-degree murder); see also Montgomery, 136 S.
Ct. at 736 (holding Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2471 (2012) (partially extending Graham v. Florida to minors guilty of homicide but
clarifying that the Eighth Amendment “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing
[life without the possibility of parole on a minor convicted of homicide]”); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (“The Constitution prohibits [imposing] a life without
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. A State need not
guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide
him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release . . . .”).
156. All states have some variant on the best-interests standard, but there is a
preference for continued contact with both parents. See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners?
Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution Parenting, 41 Fam. L.Q. 105, 114–17
(2007).
157. See Davis, There Is a Book Out, supra note 11, at 1542–49.
158. See Mnookin, supra note 67, at 226, 255–62.
159. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody:
The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 1,
2014, at 69, 72–75 (arguing that courts often cannot obtain verifiable information about
parenting because the qualitative proxies to determine best interests, such as closeness of
the relationship between a parent and child, are highly complex and difficult to assess,
and the standard gives no guidance on weighing multiple factors).
160. See id. at 95–100 (discussing how courts rely on expert opinions that assess family
violence or “parental alienation” to evaluate custody disputes).
161. For a summary of the history and ongoing use of parental alienation syndrome,
see Joan S. Meier, A Historical Perspective on Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental

256

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:227

based on interviews with only his clients and self-published without the
benefit of peer review,162 parental alienation syndrome is not recognized
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),163
and it has been uniformly discredited by psychologists.164 Despite this
lack of scientific basis, many courts and mental health professionals, who
provide highly influential custody evaluations to courts, have invoked
parental alienation syndrome.165
In light of the looser evidentiary rules used in family court,166 the
Daubert standard, developed for the purpose of distinguishing reliable
Alienation, 6 J. Child Custody 232, 235–50 (2009) [hereinafter Meier, A Historical
Perspective]; Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light
on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 Law & Ineq.
311, 316–19 (2017).
162. See Richard A. Gardner, Child Custody Litigation: A Guide for Parents and
Mental Health Professionals 76–104 (1986); Carol S. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome
and Alienated Children—Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 14 Child & Fam. L.Q.
381, 386–87 (2002) (noting Gardner self-published most of his work). Gardner conceded
that most of the studies supporting his theory were based on direct patient observation,
rather than experiments and statistical analysis. See Richard A. Gardner, Commentary on
Kelly and Johnston’s “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation
Syndrome,” 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 611, 617–18 (2004).
163. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(5th ed. 2013).
164. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear the
Burden of Proof, 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 8, 8–9 (2005) (noting that “there have been no
independent, objective, or public replications of Gardner’s assertions”); Janet R. Johnston
& Joan B. Kelly, Rejoinder to Gardner’s “Commentary on Kelly and Johnston’s ‘The
Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome,’” 42 Fam. Ct. Rev.
622, 622 (2004) (rejecting calling parental alienation syndrome “a syndrome and
grant[ing] it status as a DSM diagnostic category . . . outright”); Joan B. Kelly & Janet R.
Johnston, The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 39
Fam. Ct. Rev. 249, 249–50 (2001) (“[T]here is a relative absence of any empirical or
research support for the reliable identification of [parent alienation syndrome], other
than Gardner’s (and other proponents’) clinical experience and ‘expert testimony.’”). For
a summary of the research finding that parental alienation syndrome has no scientific
basis, see Bruch, supra note 162, at 383–89; Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note
161, at 235–40.
165. See Bruch, supra note 162, at 387–88 (discussing cases in which courts allowed
parental alienation syndrome testimony but noting that when Richard Gardner, the
psychologist who identified parental alienation syndrome, attempted to testify, most courts
disallowed the testimony, either because it went to the ultimate determination of custody
or because the court found the syndrome unsupported); Meier, A Historical Perspective,
supra note 161, at 240 (describing the ubiquity of parental alienation syndrome in family
court); Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 99–100 & n.164 (citing cases and discussing the
continuing widespread reliance on parental alienation syndrome).
166. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 161, at 240; Meier & Dickson,
supra note 161, at 319; Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 99–100 (explaining that family
courts often do not screen custody opinions from mental health professionals, may believe
the professionals are neutral and therefore do not need the scrutiny, and may believe the
court appointment itself suffices as a validation of the professional’s scientific credibility).
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scientific evidence from unreliable scientific evidence,167 is not an effective
tool for combatting parental alienation syndrome. Family courts rarely use
the test, either to screen expert witnesses in court or when drawing on
reports from mental health professionals evaluating custody.168 As a
result, highly unreliable and unscientific evidence continues to dominate
in family court.169
2. Legislation. — Empirical evidence also plays an important role in
lawmaking. Legislatures regularly use empirical evidence to identify
problems and determine appropriate solutions. When Congress passed
the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997,170 it relied on a
wealth of empirical evidence about problems plaguing the child welfare
system.171 Congress held hearings and found that the child welfare system
was not serving the interests of children because family-preservation
efforts were keeping some children in dangerous homes, the problem of
“foster care drift” (the term used to describe both long stays in foster
care and placement in multiple homes) was getting worse, and children
would be better served by promoting adoption rather than family
preservation.172 Congress responded to these problems by adopting a
167. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (holding that
before admitting expert testimony, courts must determine that the evidence is based on
reliable scientific methodology and reasoning); see also John Conley & Jane Moriarty,
Scientific and Expert Evidence 82 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that Daubert applies in federal
courts but that most states have adopted the standard or a similar one).
168. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 161, at 240–41 (“To a troubling
degree, family courts and even courts of appeal are increasingly accepting the application
of [parental alienation syndrome] . . . while sidestepping the admissibility question . . . .”);
Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 99–100 (explaining how “few jurisdictions require
systematic scrutiny” of mental health professionals’ opinions).
169. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 161, at 240–41; Scott & Emery,
supra note 159, at 99–100. But the tide may be beginning to turn. See Maxine Eichner,
Bad Medicine: Parents, the State, and the Charge of “Medical Child Abuse,” 50 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 205, 271 & n.294 (2016) (listing cases in which courts, including family courts,
rejected parental alienation syndrome as unscientific and unreliable). As Joan Meier
explains, even though courts are less likely to rely on parental alienation syndrome, they
now—and still problematically—invoke the related notion of parental alienation, which is
not characterized as a syndrome, per se, but rather as a behavior that weighs against
awarding custody to the alienating parent. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note
161, at 245–50.
170. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
171. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 637, 646–50 (1999).
172. See Promotion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected
Children: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 1–9 (1997) (discussing the
“demands on the [child welfare] system” and exploring the “pressure points at which
reform might be aimed”); Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 104th Cong. 9–10 (1996)
(statement of Richard J. Gelles, Director, Family Violence Research Program) (recounting
the results of studies finding that current family-preservation efforts were ineffective);
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standard that set a time limit on family-reunification efforts,173 thus
moving children to permanent homes more quickly and making child
safety and permanency—rather than family preservation—the paramount concerns of the child welfare system.174 In enacting ASFA,
however, Congress selectively relied on empirical evidence. It did not
focus on empirical evidence about competing concerns, such as the risks
a child faces in foster care or the developmental harm of separating a
child from a caregiver, especially during early childhood.175
Legislatures have also used empirical evidence to develop responses
to intimate partner violence. Since the 1970s, scholars in multiple
disciplines have generated significant research about the extent of
intimate partner violence, the harms it causes, and effective responses.176
Both the federal and state legislatures have invoked this evidence to
enact laws to protect victims and punish perpetrators. Evidence drove

Barriers to Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 4–64 (1996) (considering whether federal intervention was
necessary to promote adoption); Federal Adoption Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 4–9 (1995) (exploring
how to “simultaneously achieve the goals of both family preservation and timely
adoption”); Child Welfare Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 4–8 (1995) (examining lessons learned since
the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, which required the
Department of Health and Human Services to review the foster care caseload of every
state); see also Gordon, supra note 171, at 646–50 (describing this legislative history,
including the role of the Clinton Administration in pushing Congress to reform the child
welfare system).
173. As a condition of receiving federal funds, states had to commence proceedings to
terminate parental rights for children who had been in foster care for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
174. ASFA conditioned federal funds on states developing a foster-care and adoptionassistance plan in which “the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.”
Id. § 671(a)(15)(A).
175. See Gordon, supra note 171, at 646–50 (describing the evidence presented in
support of ASFA, which did not include material on these issues).
176. Intimate partner violence grew into a distinct academic discipline in the 1970s
and 1980s, with scholars from different disciplines, including law, providing a theoretical
framework for reform and legitimizing the study of the problem. See Leigh Goodmark, A
Troubled Marriage: Domestic Violence and the Legal System 9–28 (2012) [hereinafter
Goodmark, Troubled Marriage] (describing the legal and scholarly history of the intimate
partner violence movement beginning in the 1970s). Since then, intimate partner violence
has become a robust area of inquiry, studied by scholars in multiple disciplines, including
sociology, see, e.g., Richard J. Gelles & Murray A. Straus, Intimate Violence (1988),
psychology, see, e.g., Paula Nicolson, Domestic Violence and Psychology: A Critical
Perspective (2010); Katherine M. Kitzmann et al., Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence: A
Meta-Analytic Review, 71 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 339 (2003), medicine, see, e.g.,
Empowering Survivors of Abuse: Health Care for Battered Women and Their Children
(Jacquelyn C. Campbell ed., 1998), and economics, see, e.g., Anna Aizer, The Gender
Wage Gap and Domestic Violence, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 1847 (2010).
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many aspects of the federal Violence Against Women Act,177 federal
immigration law provisions that address the incentive for a noncitizen to
stay with a violent partner,178 and state laws that create civil and criminal
protection orders.179 The empirical evidence does not always support the
various legislative mandates,180 but there is no question that legislatures
regularly use empirical evidence to develop legal responses to intimate
partner violence.
3. Administration. — Under the banner of “Bringing Business
Intelligence to Child Welfare,”181 administrative agencies around the
country are beginning to use predictive analytics—which employs
statistics and modeling to forecast future events182—in their child welfare
systems.183 Without this technology, social workers in the child welfare
177. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
178. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (2012) (allowing a victim of intimate partner
violence to petition separately from a spouse or former spouse for the removal of
conditional residency); id. § 1229b(b)(2)–(4) (authorizing a victim of intimate partner
violence to self-petition for cancellation of removal rather than rely on a family member).
179. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 Yale L.J. 2, 13–17 (2006)
(describing these orders).
180. See infra text accompanying notes 277–282 (discussing the conflicting evidence
about mandatory-arrest policies and recidivism).
181. Innovations in Action, Eckerd Kids, http://www.eckerd.org/about-eckerd-kids/whatwere-doing/innovations-in-action/ [http://perma.cc/8B72-7PJ4] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
182. See Eric Siegel, Predictive Analytics: The Power to Predict Who Will Click, Buy, Lie, or
Die 15 (rev. & updated ed. 2016) (“Predictive analytics (PA)—Technology that learns from
experience (data) to predict the future behavior of individuals in order to drive better
decisions.”); Charles Nyce, Am. Inst. for CPCU & Ins. Inst. of Am., Predictive Analytics
White Paper 1 (2007), http://www.the-digital-insurer.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/
12/78-Predictive-Modeling-White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/4QUQ-Y9A4] (providing an
overview of predictive analytics). Predictive analytics is used in myriad settings, from health
care to retail marketing, and by both private and public actors. See Viktor MayerSchönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How We
Live, Work, and Think 123–49 (2013) (describing the use of predictive analytics in the
private sector); Siegel, supra, at 23–45 (describing the use of predictive analytics more
broadly); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart
City, 20 Yale. J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6–11) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing the use of data analytics at the state and particularly
local level as part of the move toward “smart cities”).
183. See, e.g., Gladys Carrión, Comm’r, N.Y.C. Admin. for Children’s Servs., Testimony
to the Commission to Eliminate Child Abuse and Neglect Fatalities 10 (Aug. 6, 2015),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/acs/pdf/testimony/2015/Commission_to_Eliminate_Child_
Abuse_and_Neglect_Fatalities_8_5_15.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JAR-BGXA] (describing New
York City’s early use of predictive analytics); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Child
Maltreatment 2015, at 133–34, 199–201 (2017) [hereinafter Child Maltreatment], http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MGJ-N6MG]
(describing the use of predictive analytics in Connecticut and Oklahoma); Marquis
Cabrera, Florida Leverages Predictive Analytics to Prevent Child Fatalities—Other
States Follow, Huffington Post (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
marquis-cabrera/florida-leverages-predictive_b_8586712.html [http://perma.cc/ZV6T-S3CK]
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system investigate cases and make pivotal decisions about cases using
their experience, intuition, and rudimentary risk assessment tools, only
some of which are empirically validated.184 Triaging cases is a daunting
prospect, with an estimated four million reports of abuse and neglect
annually,185 limited resources, and child safety and family integrity
hanging in the balance.186
Predictive analytics brings a data-driven approach to this process.187
Agencies are using it in somewhat different ways, but the model—first
developed in New Zealand in 2012—reviews reports of abuse and neglect
and determines which cases are most serious and thus deserving of intensive follow-up and intervention.188 After an agency receives a call about a
particular family, the model mines the databases of several government
systems—education, criminal justice, health, public benefits, and so on—
(describing a nonprofit’s contracts to develop and use predictive analytics in Alaska,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and Oklahoma); Dina Gusovsky, Can Life as a
Data Point Save America’s At-Risk Children?, CNBC News (Jan. 14, 2016), http://
www.cnbc.com/2016/01/14/an-80-billion-annual-tax-bill-thats-failing-our-children.html
[http://perma.cc/UG73-KRK9] (describing a pilot program using predictive analytics in
Los Angeles County); Laura Santhanam, Can Big Data Save These Children?, PBS
NewsHour (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/can-big-data-savethese-children/ [http://perma.cc/66G7-XWU2] (describing the use of predictive
analytics in Allegheny County, which includes Pittsburgh); Eckerd Kids, supra note 181
(describing the use of predictive analytics in Florida).
184. In a typical case, the child welfare agency receives a report of abuse or neglect,
and a caseworker investigates the claim and speaks with family members, the school, and
other individuals and institutions in the child’s life. The caseworker then decides whether
to substantiate the allegation of abuse or neglect and thus begin the process of state
intervention in the family. See Child Maltreatment, supra note 183, at 6 (explaining the
first step is determining whether the report should be screened in for an investigation and
noting reports are screened out for a variety of reasons, including inadequate information
in the report). For a description of the different risk assessment tools currently in use, see
Richard J. Gelles, Out of Harm’s Way: Creating an Effective Child Welfare System 104–08
(2017).
185. See Child Maltreatment, supra note 183, at 6 (noting that the number of these
reports has increased by almost sixteen percent in four years).
186. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 637,
642–52 (2006) [hereinafter Huntington, Rights Myopia] (describing the competing
demands and the stakes in the child welfare system).
187. For an excellent overview of the use of predictive analytics in child welfare as well
as a discussion of the many concerns associated with this practice, see Christopher E.
Church & Amanda J. Fairchild, In Search of a Silver Bullet: Child Welfare’s Embrace of
Predictive Analytics, 68 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 67, 68–78 (2017).
188. See Rhema Vaithianathan et al., Vulnerable Children: Can Administrative Data
Be Used to Identify Children at Risk Of Adverse Outcomes? 6–9 (2012), http://
www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/research/
vulnerable-children/auckland-university-can-administrative-data-be-used-to-identify-childrenat-risk-of-adverse-outcome.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YKU-WPZZ]. The model was also
designed to work at a much earlier stage, identifying children at risk of abuse and neglect
at the time a family member applies for a public benefit. See id. at 6. No child welfare
agency in the United States is using predictive analytics at this stage. Id.
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to obtain information about the family,189 combines this with demographic data, including age of the parents and children, education levels,
and family structure, and then adds details about the family’s past
involvement with the child welfare system, including whether the parent
spent any time in foster care.190 The model runs these data points
through a proprietary algorithm, producing a risk score for the child.191
In the United States, Eckerd Kids is a nonprofit organization
championing the use of predictive analytics and contracting with agencies around the country.192 It has developed its own predictive analytics
model that combs datasets and looks at risk factors, including the age of
the child, the presence of a “paramour” in the home, a history of
substance abuse and intimate partner violence, and the parent’s
experience in the child welfare system as a child.193 Identified cases are
slated for intensive follow-up, with the technological tool also prompting
the caseworker to follow recommended steps.194 When tested against past
cases, predictive analytics has been relatively accurate in identifying the

189. See Gusovsky, supra note 183 (describing this process in Los Angeles County).
190. See Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 10–11 (describing the family and
child demographic characteristics that are included); Gusovsky, supra note 183 (noting
the Los Angeles model combines information from the databases with information about
the family because “experts say that whoever is living with the child has a big, if not the
greatest, influence on his or her well-being”).
191. See Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 7–11 (describing how the algorithm
uses the variables to generate a risk score, or “the chance that the child who has started
the spell will have an adverse outcome by some given age”); Gusovsky, supra note 183
(detailing how the algorithm “provides a total risk score for each child based on numerous
factors, as well as a map of that child’s social network and data points related to those
connections, such as criminal history”).
192. See Cabrera, supra note 183 (describing Eckerd’s contracts with Alaska,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and Oklahoma).
193. Eckerd Kids, supra note 181.
194. See Cabrera, supra note 183 (describing the implementation of Eckerd’s Rapid
Safety Feedback program, which uses predictive analytics to reduce child fatality).
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cases that resulted in child fatalities or severe injuries,195 but it has a high
rate of false positives.196
Administrative agencies also use empirical evidence to develop
programs to support families. The abundant research establishing the
importance of early childhood development has been particularly
influential.197 In cities and states around the country, administrative
agencies are adopting programs to promote language development and
other skills in the first few years of life. In Providence, Rhode Island, the
Mayor’s Office implemented Providence Talks, a program to boost
language skills during early childhood with biweekly coaching sessions
and a “word pedometer” to help parents track their children’s language
exposure.198 In Oklahoma, the Department of Education offers a range
of early childhood programs and services designed to prepare children
for kindergarten.199 And in multiple cities and states, administrative
agencies provide voluntary home-visiting programs to promote child

195. See Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 15–25 (describing the accuracy of the
predictions and noting that the algorithm had a seventy-six percent area under the
Receiver Operator Characteristic curve—a model with 100% area under the curve is
considered to have a perfect fit in terms of predictive power); Santhanam, supra note 183
(describing how Allegheny County found the model highly predictive of abuse and noting
that “[a]mong children with the highest risk score, 40 percent were removed from their
homes less than a year later” and “[a]mong those with the lowest risk score, the likelihood
of entering foster care was . . . 0.3 percent”). See generally Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al.,
Preventing Severe and Fatal Maltreatment: Making the Case for the Expanded Use and
Integration of Data, 92 Child Welfare 59, 64–70 (2013) (describing the model and the
benefits of drawing on multiple sources of data through an automated system rather than
the current approach).
196. See Church & Fairchild, supra note 187, at 71–72 (discussing the high rate of
false positives); Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 18 (noting if services are offered to
the 3,284 children in the two groups with the highest risk scores, “1,211 children will have
a maltreatment finding before age 5 and 2,073 [will] not”); Daniel Heimpel, Uncharted
Waters: Data Analytics and Child Protection in Los Angeles, Chron. Soc. Change (July 20,
2015), http://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/uncharted-waters-data-analytics-andchild-protection-in-los-angeles/10867 [http://perma.cc/H4VA-C6WR] (noting that when
applied to Los Angeles data, predictive analytics correctly identified seventy-six percent of
the cases that resulted in death, near death, or severe injury but that the model also led to
a false positive rate of more than ninety-five percent). A different concern is the lack of
transparency in the algorithm. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 182, at 11–22.
197. For a summary of this research, see generally Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A.
Phillips, Nat’l Acad. Sci., From Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early
Childhood Development (2000).
198. About, Providence Talks, http://www.providencetalks.org/about [http://perma.cc/
3AEY-B7HY] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
199. Early Childhood and Family Education, Okla. State Dep’t of Educ., http://
sde.ok.gov/sde/early-childhood-and-family-education [http://perma.cc/55CB-KV3Z] (last
updated Aug. 17, 2017).
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health and learning in the first years of life.200 These agencies regularly
invoke the research on early childhood development to support their
programs.201
C.

Patterns in the Empirical Turn

As the above description illustrates, there are many kinds of
empirical evidence in family law. Sometimes empirical evidence reflects
relatively uncontested statistics, such as the number of children being
raised by same-sex parents.202 Sometimes empirical evidence is
embedded in a data-driven metric, such as predictive analytics. And
often, empirical evidence reflects hotly contested correlations, such as

200. See, e.g., Home Visiting, Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., http://
health.mo.gov/living/families/homevisiting/ [http://perma.cc/K7KY-K9Z7] (last visited
Sept. 11, 2017).
201. See, e.g., Research, Providence Talks, http://www.providencetalks.org/research/
[http://perma.cc/6X69-9YGZ] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
202. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763 (E.D. Mich.) (relying on
testimony from demographer Gary Gates that 5,300 children in Michigan were being
raised by same-sex couples), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing a study by the Williams Institute for the proposition that
eighteen percent of same-sex couples in California are raising children), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601
(relying on demographic data in an amicus brief showing that married same-sex couples
experience economic advantages that unmarried same-sex couples do not).
Statistics can, of course, be subject to contest. For further discussion of counting
families headed by same-sex parents, see Gary J. Gates & Michael D. Steinberger, Same-Sex
Unmarried Partner Couples in the American Community Survey: The Role of
Misreporting, Miscoding and Misallocation 13–21 (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://economics-files.pomona.edu/steinberger/research/Gates_Steinberger_ACS_
Miscode_May2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LY6-ZGGP] (demonstrating that the U.S.
Census both undercounts and overcounts children raised by same-sex parents). For an
acknowledgement of the difference in counting same-sex couples raising children
versus families headed by an LGBT parent, who may be single, see Same-Sex Couple and
LGBT Demographic Data Interactive, Williams Inst. (May 2016), http://
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-stats/?topic=LGBT#demographic [http://
perma.cc/NE7G-MFLU].
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the relationship between race and child maltreatment203 or family structure and child outcomes.204
Similarly, the quality of empirical evidence used in family law ranges
broadly. Sometimes evidentiary standards sufficiently screen for quality,
such as the trial courts’ rejection of some of the evidence introduced by
supporters of different-sex marriage requirements.205 But sometimes
courts, especially family courts, use evidence that falls far short of
scientific standards, such as the invocation of parental alienation
syndrome.206 And both courts and legislatures can use evidence that is
politically motivated and highly selective, such as the finding that women
who terminate a pregnancy experience depression and other mental
health side effects.207
Beyond these differences, decisionmakers use empirical evidence in
a variety of ways. In litigation, judges typically use empirical evidence to
establish what Professor Kenneth Culp Davis famously, if somewhat
confusingly, called legislative facts.208 These are not facts found by the
legislature (or facts about legislatures) but rather background social facts
about the world used to decide broad questions of law and policy.209 The
203. See Annie E. Casey Found., Disparities and Disproportionality in Child Welfare:
Analysis of the Research 7 (2011), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECFDisparitiesAndDisproportionalityInChildWelfare-2011.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G9VV-EUC7]
(conducting a meta-analysis examining the correlation between race and child
maltreatment); Andrea J. Sedlak et al., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Supplementary
Analyses of Race Differences in Child Maltreatment Rates in the NIS-4, at 4 (2010),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_supp_analysis_race_diff_mar2010.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QJJ2-H9XE] (offering potential explanations for the NIS-4’s finding of a
correlation between race and child maltreatment).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 112–117.
205. See supra text accompanying note 105.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 161–169.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 131–135; infra text accompanying notes 291–
294.
208. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402–03 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, Problems
of Evidence] (distinguishing legislative and adjudicative facts); Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559,
561–71 (1987) (describing a “social framework” role for empirical evidence: using it to
evaluate a contested issue in a case, such as the reliability of the testimony of a specific
eyewitness, by providing a broader context for understanding the reliability of eyewitness
testimony generally).
209. See Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 208, at 402–03. Courts can consider
evidence outside the record to establish legislative facts, but it is often the plaintiffs who
introduce the evidence. Advocates deploy empirical evidence to establish legislative facts,
such as introducing evidence about the economic benefits of marriage, and to establish
adjudicative facts, such as introducing evidence about Shaken Baby Syndrome to show that
a particular child was injured by a parent. See supra text accompanying note 97; infra text
accompanying notes 283–287. Advocates also use empirical evidence to undermine an
opponent’s case, such as the plaintiffs in the marriage equality cases presenting empirical
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use of empirical evidence to adjudicate legislative facts is not new. From
the Brandeis brief to the doll study in Brown v. Board of Education,210
courts have looked to empirical evidence for this purpose.211
In family law, legislative facts deeply influence judicial determinations of rights. When a court finds, based on empirical evidence,
that children raised by same-sex parents have similar outcomes as
children raised by different-sex parents, this legislative fact informs the
court’s judgment about the state’s purported rationale in limiting
marriage to different-sex couples.212 When a court finds, based on
empirical evidence, that witnessing intimate partner violence can be
harmful to children but that foster care presents its own harm, these
legislative facts help the court assess the constitutionality of policies
removing children from homes with intimate partner violence.213 In a
variety of contexts, then, social science and hard science inform judicial
understandings of the implications of legal rules or the underlying
conditions giving rise to familial conflicts.
Legislative facts differ from adjudicative facts, which are case-specific
facts about the parties before the court.214 Courts regularly use empirical
evidence to establish adjudicative facts as well. Thus, when the Court
applied the undue burden test in Whole Woman’s Health, it dissected the
evidence about the actual effects of the restrictions at issue on the
availability of abortion in Texas.215
In legislatures, lawmakers also establish facts, although these are
generally called legislative findings, not facts. Lawmakers use empirical
evidence to establish legislative priorities, understand the contours of a
evidence about child outcomes to show that bias, not a concern about child well-being,
animated the different-sex marriage requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 96–
100.
210. See 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954) (“Whatever may have been the extent of
psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, [the finding that children of
color are harmed educationally and psychologically by segregation] is amply supported by
modern authority.”); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of
Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality 315–40 (1975) (describing the efforts
of the plaintiffs to build their social science case in the trial court and the difficulty of
showing that psychological harm stemmed from legal segregation and not prejudice more
broadly).
211. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 931, 933–40
(1980) (arguing empirical evidence—as it relates to legislative facts—influences
constitutional reasoning). Examples include the use of evidence about group size and
decisionmaking to determine the constitutionality of a five-person jury, evidence on
pornography and illegal behavior to uphold a zoning regulation, and evidence about the
availability of contraceptives and early sexual activity to uphold a law restricting access to
birth control for minors. Id.
212. See supra section I.B.1.a.
213. See supra section I.B.1.c.
214. See Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 208, at 402–03.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 127–130.
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given social problem, and divine possible links between policy tools and
preferred outcomes.216
Administrative agencies use empirical evidence to develop and
implement policies. When an agency decides on a priority, or implements a state mandate, it turns to empirical evidence to guide the
policy choices. The Mayor’s Office in Providence used research on effective early childhood interventions to design the program elements of
Providence Talks.217 Administrative agencies also use empirical evidence
to distribute resources. When deciding how to allocate caseworker time
in the child welfare system, predictive analytics directs attention to the
highest-risk cases.218 And, finally, administrative agencies use empirical
evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. Intervention
programs, for instance, now regularly incorporate evaluation mechanisms.219
This description of the empirical turn is not to claim that legal
actors are using only empirical evidence across family law’s institutions.
Moreover, when legal actors use empirical evidence, they can do so for a
variety of reasons, as elaborated below.220 But there is no doubt that
family law has embraced empirical evidence, a turn that has considerable
upsides and downsides, as the next Part explores.
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF AN EMPIRICAL FAMILY LAW
Family law can and should draw on the wealth of research on
families. There are numerous advantages to an empirically based family
law, and this Part briefly outlines these benefits. But there are also
substantial bases for concern. Beyond the common problems of
reliability and translation by legal actors, there are fundamental concerns
about the multiple ways empirical evidence skews decisionmaking. As this
Part argues in detail, empirical evidence focuses attention on the
outcomes of legal rules, not competing values. It provides political cover
for the value judgments that are made. And it risks replicating historical
discrimination against nondominant families.

216. There is considerable literature about the comparative institutional competence
of legislatures, as compared with courts, to gather facts. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886–87, 920–25
(2003) (comparing the institutional capacities of courts and legislatures).
217. See supra text accompanying note 198.
218. See supra text accompanying note 188.
219. See Flowers, supra note 34, at 192–95 (discussing various means of evaluating
collected data and of implementing insights).
220. See infra section II.B.2.b.
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The Benefits of Evidence-Based Family Law

At the most basic level, family law and policies should draw on a wellinformed understanding of family life. A periodic, congressionally
mandated study of the incidence of child maltreatment, for example,
illuminates the risk factors for child abuse and neglect. That study found
that children in families with low socioeconomic status experience seven
times the rate of neglect as children in families with higher
socioeconomic status.221 This is a critical starting point for addressing and
attempting to reduce the incidence of child neglect.
More specifically, a rigorous, research-based approach to family law
helps the government be more effective in its efforts, giving legal actors a
clearer sense of where legal inputs might yield particular social
outcomes. A recent study, for example, found that providing legal
counsel to victims of intimate partner violence had substantial benefits:
Over time, women reported substantially less physical violence in their
lives, improved psychological well-being, and increased income.222
Another example is groundbreaking work by economists Raj Chetty and

221. See Andrea J. Sedlak et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Fourth National
Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-4): Report to Congress 12 (2010),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_report_exec_summ_pdf_jan2010.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EXU5-83KW].
222. See Carolyn Copps Hartley & Lynette M. Renner, The Longer-Term Influence of
Civil Legal Services on Battered Women 7–8, 52–62 (2016), http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/249879.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PFU-HZTY]. As explored in section
II.B, there are often questions about a study’s methodology and thus its relevance to legal
debates. In this study, for example, the researchers could not, for both ethical and
methodological reasons, use a control group. See id. at 30 (explaining that it would be
unethical to assign some victims to a no-treatment group when the victims are facing
imminent and significant danger). The researchers thus used a panel-study method,
comparing the same group over time. See id.
A related benefit is that empirical evidence informs both academic and policy
debates. An empirical study of the impact of burdens of proof in child protection cases,
for example, demonstrated that increasing the standard of proof decreased the number of
substantiated reports, primarily affecting cases that were difficult to prove. See Nicholas E.
Kahn, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Standard of Proof in the
Substantiation of Child Abuse and Neglect, 14 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 333, 356–57
(2017). Similarly, the sociological research identifying a typology of intimate partner
violence, see Michael P. Johnson, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism,
Violent Resistance, and Situational Couple Violence (2008), has led to a sustained debate
about both the typology itself, see Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory, supra note 10,
at 4, 6, 12–16 (arguing Johnson’s data do not support his typology or his claim that
intimate terrorism is a rare phenomenon and identifying flaws in the research and
conclusions), and the typology’s legal consequences, see Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating
Types of Domestic Violence: Implications for Child Custody, 65 La. L. Rev. 1379, 1384–414
(2005) (contemplating the effect of Johnson’s research on state intervention, particularly
on allocating resources and determining child custody). In short, empirical work provides
an important grounding for law-reform debates.
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Emmanuel Saez on economic mobility.223 Their work has unearthed
specific factors—particularly racial segregation, concentrated poverty,
and a lack of transportation infrastructure—that deeply influence economic mobility.224 The research shows the positive benefits of some
government efforts, such as the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s Moving to Opportunity program, which helps families
move from areas of high poverty to more mixed-income, higheropportunity neighborhoods.225
Relatedly, empirical evidence can guide state investments,
promoting the more efficient and effective use of scarce resources.
Economist James Heckman has shown that investing in early childhood is
far more cost effective for producing desirable long-term outcomes, such
as high school graduation rates and adult earnings, than investments
later in childhood and in adult training programs.226 At the federal level,
President Obama was a leader in using empirical evidence to evaluate
governmental programs, determining which were supported by evidence
and which were not and, thus, should be changed or defunded.227
Obama ran into political resistance as well as bureaucratic inertia when
he tried to drop programs,228 but he was successful in supporting new
programs with a strong evidence bases, such as teen pregnancy
prevention efforts.229 As this example demonstrates, empirical evidence
does not necessarily overcome entrenched interests and political
preferences, but it can structure the debate about state policies and
investments in families and children.

223. How Can We Improve Economic Opportunities for Our Children? We Use Big
Data to Identify New Pathways to Upward Mobility, Equal. of Opportunity Project, http://
www.equality-of-opportunity.org/ [http://perma.cc/M6H9-BTET] (last visited Sept. 11,
2017).
224. See Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. Econ. 1553, 1554–62, 1586–620
(2014).
225. See Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on
Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 Am. Econ. Rev.
855, 870–76 (2016).
226. See James J. Heckman, Giving Kids a Fair Chance 5–6, 13–41 (2013).
227. See Ron Haskins & Greg Margolis, Show Me the Evidence: Obama’s Fight for
Rigor and Results in Social Policy 2–30 (2015) (explaining the Obama Administration’s
policy of evaluating social intervention programs on the basis of rigorous evidence).
228. See Ron Haskins & Jon Baron, The Obama Administration’s Evidence-Based Social
Policy Initiatives: An Overview, in Evidence for Social Policy and Practice 28, 28–29 (2011),
http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/evidence_for_social_policy_and_practice.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QHX4-ZC4A] (observing that, even when an empirical evaluation finds
a program to be ineffective, “it does not follow that the Administration or Congress will
take action”).
229. See Haskins & Margolis, supra note 227, at 67–101 (explaining the Obama
Administration’s approach to reducing teen pregnancy).
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Empirical evidence can also justify state intervention in families,
overcoming the basic rule of family autonomy. The child welfare system,
for example, is predicated on the empirically grounded understanding
that child abuse and neglect are harmful to children.230 Similarly, legal
rules and policies around intimate partner violence are based on the
knowledge that intimate partner violence has significant and far-reaching
negative consequences both for individuals and society more broadly.231
Additionally, drawing on empirical evidence can help unmask
prejudice and help dislodge stereotypes. A persistent cultural image is
the dysfunctional Black family and particularly the absent Black father.232
Recent empirical evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, challenges
this stereotype. As compared with white and Latino men, Black men who
do not live with their children are more likely to maintain better coparenting relationships with the mothers of their children and more
likely to be involved with their children.233 Another example is the debiasing evidence produced in the marriage equality cases. In Perry, one of
the proponents of California’s constitutional amendment was the
secretary of the America Return to God Prayer Movement, which
operated a website containing statements urging people to vote for the
amendment because “homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest
children.”234 The trial court used evidence introduced at trial to rebut
230. See Weithorn, supra note 67, at 55–60 (describing the work of Henry Kempe
establishing Battered Child Syndrome and the role of this research in spurring the
creation of the modern child welfare system).
231. S. Rep. No. 103-138, pt. 3, at 41–42 (1993) (citing evidence about the rate of
intimate partner violence and the ensuing cost and noting that “we spend $5 to $10 billion
a year on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic violence”).
232. See Office of Policy Planning & Research, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Negro
Family: The Case for National Action 5, 47 (1965), http://web.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe/
Moynihan%27s%20The%20Negro%20Family.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SMA-6M6R] (arguing
measures such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were insufficient to assure African Americans
full participation in society and partly blaming “the deterioration of the Negro family” on
its “tangle of pathology . . . capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white
world although also noting the large context of “three centuries of injustice”).
233. See Kathryn Edin & Timothy J. Nelson, Doing the Best I Can: Fatherhood in the
Inner City 215 (2013) (“[O]ur black fathers are more involved than the white fathers are
with their children, especially when the kids are younger.”); Marcia J. Carlson et al.,
Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Young Children After a
Nonmarital Birth, 45 Demography 461, 473 (2008) (finding, among nonresident fathers,
Black men were more likely than white or Hispanic men to have maintained contact with
their children); Robert I. Lerman, Capabilities and Contributions of Unwed Fathers,
Future Child., Fall 2010, at 63, 64, 75 (“Black fathers are more likely than white and
Hispanic fathers to maintain close contact with their children, especially in cases when the
father neither marries nor cohabits with the mother.”).
234. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing trial
transcript pages 1919–22), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also
id. at 982–83 (using evidence to refute the stereotypes “that gays and lesbians are affluent,
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this and other stereotypes.235 Similarly, trial courts used the Daubert test
to dismiss expert testimony that was rooted in prejudice rather than
scientifically grounded empirical evidence.236
Finally, an empirically based family law helps provide a counterweight to politically fraught battles over family regulation. Overwhelming
evidence has shown that childhood vaccines promote individual as well as
communal health.237 There are risks for individual children,238 but there
is no credible evidence that vaccines during early childhood cause
widespread harm among children or that vaccines contribute to
conditions such as autism.239 Based on this evidence, professional groups,
such as the American Academy of Pediatricians, have stated their
unqualified support for vaccinating young children.240 Empirical
evidence does not easily combat motivated cognition,241 and thus, it has
self-absorbed and incapable of forming long-term intimate relationships” and that they are
“disease vectors or . . . child molesters who recruit young children into homosexuality”).
235. See id. at 982–85 (finding no evidence to support this stereotype).
236. See id. at 948 (rejecting expert testimony of think tank founder David
Blankenhorn because “nothing in the record other than the ‘bald assurance’ of
Blankenhorn suggests that Blankenhorn’s investigation into marriage has been conducted
to the ‘same level of intellectual rigor’ characterizing the practice of anthropologists,
sociologists or psychologists” (first quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311,
1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (on remand); then quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 152 (1999))).
237. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Why Are Childhood Vaccines So
Important?, Vaccines & Immunizations, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/howvpd.htm
[http://perma.cc/928E-7EQZ] (last updated Aug. 18, 2017) (explaining that vaccines
have prevented countless cases of diseases and saved millions of lives).
238. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with These
Vaccines?, Vaccines & Preventable Diseases, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/should-notvacc.html [http://perma.cc/3S5Q-DRY2] (last updated May 8, 2017) (specifying circumstances
in which certain children should not be vaccinated, often because of allergies or underlying
medical conditions).
239. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vaccines Do Not Cause Autism, Vaccine
Safety, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html [http://perma.cc/9YKER9ZG] (last updated Nov. 23, 2015).
240. Karen Remley, American Academy of Pediatrics Reiterates Safety and Importance
of Vaccines, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.aap.org/
en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/pages/American-Academy-of-Pediatrics-ReiteratesSafety-and-Importance-of-Vaccines.aspx [http://perma.cc/R7KJ-ZAWQ].
241. See Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want to See: Motivational
Influences on Visual Perception, 91 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 612, 612–13 (2006)
(describing the literature finding that people perceive the world around them, including
factual information, in a manner that is consistent with their beliefs); Cultural Cognition
Project at Yale Law School, http://www.culturalcognition.net/ [http://perma.cc/NP8A-5U8Y]
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to
conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact (e.g., whether humans are causing global
warming; whether the death penalty deters murder; whether gun control makes society more
safe or less) to values that define their cultural identities.”). For an example in family law, see
The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Cultural Cognition of Gay and Lesbian
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not necessarily changed the minds of those vehemently opposed to
childhood vaccines.242 Nor does evidence always overcome political
preferences.243 But the empirical evidence has helped sway public policy,
with states such as California tightening grounds for legal exemptions.244
More broadly, the widespread availability of data and work in behavioral
economics and other fields showing that human decisionmaking is prone
to multiple biases has encouraged the use of empirical evidence and
data-driven decisionmaking.245 The reliance in the public, private, and
nonprofit sectors on data, algorithms, and so on is an attempt to correct
for these biases and imperfections. In short, empirical evidence holds the
potential—even if it does not always deliver—to help depoliticize debates
and focus attention on workable solutions.246
B.

The Empirical Turn in Critical Perspective

Despite the many benefits of an empirically based family law, there
are also significant concerns. This section draws on the larger literature
about evidence-based and data-driven decisionmaking to identify and
explore what is concerning and fraught about the empirical turn in
family law.247 This section identifies threshold concerns about the quality
Parenting: Summary of First Round Data Collection 16 [hereinafter Cultural Cognition
Project Study], http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/386437/4705742/1264041920357/
Stage+1+Report.pdf?token=s1fuz1P6cvBYibVBP2pLhKH7oBQ%3D [http://perma.cc/5A5DRSZT] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“A majority of Americans say that their position on gay
and lesbian adoption is centered on the welfare of children. However, few say they would
change their minds if shown convincing contrary evidence.”).
242. See, e.g., Autism and the Vaccine Debate, Focus for Health, http://
www.focusforhealth.org/autism-and-vaccine-debate/ [http://perma.cc/5C45-ZUXC] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“The debate over whether or not vaccines contribute to the
development of autism is far from settled.”).
243. See Shear et al., supra note 14 (describing how then-President-Elect Trump met
with Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a vaccine skeptic, and asked him to lead a commission on
vaccine safety).
244. See S.B. 277, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (describing the new law as
“eliminat[ing] the exemption from existing specified immunization requirements based
upon personal beliefs”).
245. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 3–15 (2011) (showing how
human decisionmaking reflects multiple, predictable biases); Mayer-Schönberger &
Cukier, supra note 182, at 6–18 (discussing the role of big data in “humankind’s quest to
quantify and understand the world”).
246. For another example, see Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 184–91 (2015) [hereinafter
Huntington, Postmarital Family Law] (describing the debate about child outcomes and
family structure and analyzing the growing evidence that family structure itself, and not
just poverty and other characteristics that often accompany nonmarital childbearing,
contribute to worse child outcomes).
247. See, e.g., Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the
Media, Politicians, and Activists 32 (2001) (explaining many statistics are produced
inaccurately, by guessing or by relying on flawed sampling, measurements, or definitions);
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of research and the ability of legal actors to use empirical evidence.
These concerns are not particularly new, and this section thus describes
these problems expeditiously. The section then turns to the heart of the
Essay, arguing that even in a world of perfect information, with legal
actors well trained in the use of evidence, the empirical turn can
influence decisionmaking in troubling ways.
1. Reliability and Translation. — Much empirical evidence on the
family is less reliable than a casual observer might conclude. The most
fundamental question is whether empirical evidence on families—
especially social scientific evidence—satisfies basic scientific norms.
Methodological concerns are rife. As noted in the marriage equality decisions, many studies on the family use small convenience samples and not
large cross-sections of the population.248 Further, because of ethical
concerns, subjects are not randomly assigned to control and intervention
groups. It would be unethical, for example, to remove some children
from homes that are perceived to pose a threat to the child’s physical
safety and leave another group of children in homes with the same
perceived threat level. Hence, when researchers compare outcomes for
children placed in foster care and children left at home, they are not
comparing similar groups.249
By contrast, when the state offers a limited benefit—say, spaces in a
Head Start program—it can randomly assign participants. But even then,
and again for ethical reasons, the state will often recommend that
families in the control group receive another kind of intervention. This is
indeed what happened with the Head Start studies and may be one
reason why these studies show a modest impact for Head Start—the
comparison was not between Head Start and no preschool but rather

Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and
Threatens Democracy 7–8, 10, 12 (2016) (arguing “weapons of math destruction” are selfperpetuating models that work in bulk, are relied upon despite the fact that they are
prone to error, and affect a range of decisions, including advertising and prison
sentencing). For one of the foundational critiques of empiricism within law, see Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 6–7, 23, 87, 125–27,
131, 211–12 (2002) (arguing legal scholars often do not follow the same rules of inference
as are used in the social and natural sciences, give “over-confident” conclusions, fail to
address selection biases, exclude reliability analyses, lack blind peer-review and
documentation of data sources, and rely on improper random sampling).
248. See supra text accompanying note 114. The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study is a notable exception. See infra text accompanying notes 272–274.
249. For a discussion of these challenges, see Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Causal Effects of
Foster Care: An Instrumental-Variables Approach, 35 Child. & Youth Servs. Rev. 1143,
1143–44 (2013). Researchers try to account for this in a variety of ways. See, e.g., id.
(describing the possibility of testing the causal effects of removal by using the natural
experiment of varying removal recommendations among caseworkers and finding that, for
marginal cases, foster care placement is associated with higher juvenile delinquency rates
later in life and no corresponding increase in child safety).
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between Head Start and a different program.250 There are numerous
other reasons family research may be less reliable than some other areas
of research.251
Another problem potentially compromising reliability is bias.
Empirical evidence carries a mantle of objectivity, but despite the
availability of clear research standards,252 studies are not always neutral
explorations of the world of families.253 This bias can come from multiple
sources. When research is funded by an entity with a stake in the answer,
this vested interest casts a shadow over the research.254 Further, a
researcher can influence a study if the researcher has an ideological
commitment—sometimes acknowledged, sometimes unacknowledged—

250. See U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Head Start Impact Study Final Report, at iii–v
(2010),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/executive_summary_final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YY6C-7G5X] (noting that sixty percent of the children in the control
group were enrolled in some kind of group program and describing the impact of Head
Start but also noting that the effects largely did not persist into the school years). Indeed,
when researchers study the impact of early childhood programs as a whole, there are
marked benefits, both in the short and long term. See Lynn A. Karoly, M. Rebecca Kilburn
& Jill S. Cannon, Early Childhood Interventions: Proven Results, Future Promise 55–78,
128–29 (2005).
251. See Robert E. Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence for a Cause: Scholar-Advocacy
Bias in Family Law, 54 Fam. Ct. Rev. 134, 135, 141–44 (2016) [hereinafter Emery et al.,
“Bending” Evidence] (noting there are relatively few family researchers and thus relatively
few studies overall and discussing the debate about overnight visits for very young
children, which turned on only four studies); Irwin Sandler et al., Convenient and
Inconvenient Truths in Family Law: Preventing Scholar-Advocacy Bias in the Use of Social
Science Research for Public Policy, 54 Fam. Ct. Rev. 150, 151 (2016) (“[A] major
limitation on the use of research to shape policy and practice in the family law field is the
paucity of research evidence that is sufficiently replicated and based on valid methodology
to have clear and unambiguous implications for practice and policy . . . .”).
252. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 136 (noting that in
social science scholarship “the scholar’s purpose is to be, insofar as possible, self-aware and
critical about prior assumptions, personal values, and biases, willing to subject hypotheses
to rigorous inquiry and falsifiable tests, and prepared to consider alternative
interpretations of the data”).
253. In addition to the problems identified in the text, data can be flawed. See Solon
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 684
(2016) (describing the ways “institutions might maintain systematically less accurate,
precise, timely, and complete records for certain classes of people” and noting that
“[e]ven a dataset with individual records of consistently high quality can suffer from
statistical biases that fail to represent different groups in accurate proportions”); see also
Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 535, 546 (2014) (“Data is often
deeply infused with the subjective judgments of those who collect and organize it.”).
254. This was an issue in the marriage equality context, with the trial court in DeBoer
discounting one of the central studies relied upon by the defendants because it had been
funded by a party seeking to show children benefited when raised by different-sex parents.
See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.
2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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that seeps into the study design and the interpretation of the results.255 A
controversial example is research on family preservation efforts for
children at risk of foster care placement. Some scholars contend this
research has an ideological bias in favor of family preservation, which, in
turn, influences the result.256
Researchers also bring cultural biases around race and class to their
research, which can influence the focus of inquiry, study design, and the
interpretation of data. Research on parenting, for example, usually
follows a taxonomy of parenting styles: authoritarian, authoritative,
permissive, and disengaged.257 This taxonomy, however, is based on
white, middle-class families and does not incorporate a style of parenting
more associated with Black women—strict but nurturing.258 Once
identified, researchers could determine that this style of parenting is
correlated with positive outcomes for children, but before it was
acknowledged, this style of parenting was subsumed under the more
pathologized model of authoritarian parenting.259 In this way,
researchers can interpret some behavior as pathological rather than
merely adaptive or a different way of flourishing.
This cultural myopia can profoundly affect research. The influential
Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, which largely studied
white, middle-class individuals, found a correlation between family-based

255. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 134, 141–44 (coining
the term scholar-advocacy bias, defined “as the intentional or unintentional use of the
language, methods, and approaches of social science research, as well as one’s status as an
expert, for the purpose and/or outcome of legitimizing advocacy claims at the cost of
misrepresenting research findings”). For an example of this critique, see Ummni Khan,
Antiprostitution Feminism and the Surveillance of Sex Industry Clients, in Feminist
Surveillance Studies 189, 193–202 (Rachel E. Dubrofsky & Shoshana Amielle Magnet eds.,
2015) (describing this problem in research on sex workers conducted by those with an
antiprostitution bias).
256. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Thoughts on the Liberal Dilemma in Child Welfare
Reform, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 725, 726–27 (2016) (critiquing the “corrupt policyresearch merger” and contending that some researchers choose programs, such as family
preservation, that reflect the researchers’ values and then set out “not to test, but instead
to prove the programs’ efficacy” in an effort to persuade policymakers to adopt the
preferred program).
257. See Diana Baumrind, The Development of Instrumental Competence Through
Socialization, in 7 Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology 3, 13–14 (Anne D. Pick ed.,
1973) (describing the taxonomy of parenting styles); see also Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Lisa
B. Markman, The Contribution of Parenting to Ethnic and Racial Gaps in School
Readiness, Future Child., Spring 2005, at 139, 148 (applying Baumrind’s scheme to Black
mothers).
258. See Brooks-Gunn & Markman, supra note 257, at 148 (noting that studies have
found that Black mothers more frequently exhibit “tough love” parenting styles than do
white mothers).
259. See id.

2018]

THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW

275

trauma and abuse and long-term health.260 But when researchers
conducted follow-up studies with a more diverse population, they found
that other childhood traumas, including experiencing discrimination,
living in an unsafe neighborhood, and witnessing community violence,
were also highly predictive of long-term health.261 The original study did
not account for these consequences of structural racism and inequality,
which affect low-income youth and youth of color, and thus did not fully
capture the adverse circumstances of some children’s lives.262
Relatedly, researchers—intentionally or not—can frame research to
confirm preexisting beliefs rather than to challenge them. For example,
a persistent question in welfare policy is whether providing low-income
families with material support will encourage these families to have
additional children.263 Researchers typically do not, however, ask middleincome families whether the availability of public education or the larger
houses enabled by the home mortgage-interest deduction encourage
them to have more children. It might be that these middle-class parents
are indeed responding to such incentives. This would show that families
across the income spectrum respond to governmental incentives and
subsidies, but the failure to pose the question across class lines skews
public policy. Only low-income families are assumed to possess pathologies that need to be tamed.

260. Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household
Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 Am. J. Preventive Med. 245, 251 (1998).
261. See Peter F. Cronholm et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences: Expanding the
Concept of Adversity, 49 Am. J. Preventive Med. 354, 355 (2015) (noting other
community-level factors associated with long-term health); David Finkelhor et al.,
Improving the Adverse Childhood Experiences Study Scale, 167 J. Am. Med. Ass’n
Pediatrics 70, 70–71 (2013) (“Among the predictors missing from the ACE Study model
are peer rejection, exposure to violence outside the family, low socioeconomic status, and
poor academic performance.”); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Straight Out of Compton:
Developmental Equality and a Critique of the Compton School Litigation, 45 Cap. U. L.
Rev. 199, 235–45 (2017) (exploring this research and its implications for law).
262. More broadly, some of the foundational research on child development was
conducted using only white children. See Guthrie, supra note 62, at 50–52; Nancy E.
Dowd, Black Boys Matter: Developmental Equality, 45 Hofstra L. Rev. 47, 59–61 (2016)
(describing this research and its built-in biases).
263. This concern is reflected in family cap provisions, which limit welfare benefits to
existing children. At least nineteen states have such provisions. Welfare Reform: Family Cap
Policies, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/human-services/welfare-reform-family-cap-policies.aspx
[http://perma.cc/9UWUUMTC]. For example, in California until January 2017, if a child was born to a woman who
had been receiving assistance for the ten previous months, the woman could not receive
additional support for the child unless the pregnancy was the result of rape, incest, or
“conceived as a result of contraceptive failure if the parent was using an intrauterine
device, a Norplant, or the sterilization of either parent.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 11450.04(b)(3) (repealed 2017).
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A different element of reliability is whether the data are complete. It
is important to ask which groups are not included in a study. Family
scholars in multiple disciplines routinely rely on data from the American
Time Use Survey (ATUS).264 Conducted by the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, the ATUS measures the amount of
time participants spend doing specified activities, including paid labor,
childcare, housework, and leisure activities.265 The data are collected
through phone interviews.266 The Bureau of Labor Statistics tries to
include families without telephones by sending letters to their addresses
and providing a toll-free number for individuals to call,267 but it is not
surprising that the survey radically underrepresents people on the
margins of society.268 ATUS thus gives an incomplete picture of American
families.
There is a limit to what is known and, more fundamentally, what is
knowable.269 Much social science research, especially on the family,
cannot account for all the variables affecting outcomes. There is overwhelming evidence that children raised by married parents have better
outcomes than children raised in any other family structure.270 Once
factors that are correlated with family structure are taken into account,
particularly income and parental education, the differences are far less
pronounced.271 But even then, there remains a gap. The lead researchers
of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study hypothesize that family
structure plays a causal role in child outcomes because nonmarital
families experience higher levels of relationship instability and multipartner fertility; these factors contribute to worse outcomes because the
relationship stress associated with changing partners negatively affects
264. See, e.g., Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Changing Rhythms of American Family Life
174, 223 (2006) (indicating that the study considered “time diaries” that were collected as
part of the ATUS).
265. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
http://www.bls.gov/tus/atusfaqs.htm#1 [http://perma.cc/SC6B-23PN] (last visited Sept. 11,
2017).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See Katharine G. Abraham et al., Nonresponse in the American Time Use Survey:
Who Is Missing from the Data and How Much Does It Matter?, 70 Pub. Opinion Q. 676,
678, 697–98 (2006) (analyzing respondents and finding that people who are weakly
integrated into the community are less likely to participate, largely because they are not
contacted).
269. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 135 (“Given the broad
reach of family law, the rare use of random assignment studies (the ‘gold standard’ of
scientific research), and the relatively small number of studies (and researchers) in the
field, the ultimate empirical truth regarding many family law controversies often is ‘more
research is needed.’”).
270. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 31–34 (discussing child
outcomes and parental marital status).
271. See id. at 37.
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parenting.272 But even accounting for this causal role of family structure,
the question about the full impact of family structure on child outcomes
is partly unanswerable. After controlling for observable characteristics,
there may be other, nonobservable characteristics that affect both family
structure and outcomes. A person with strong interpersonal skills might
choose to get married and stay married, and this kind of person might
also be a more effective parent. This separate characteristic would drive
the family structure and the child outcome, but it is difficult for an
outside researcher to identify this characteristic.273 Researchers try to
account for this selection bias in a number of different ways, but there is
no easy way around the problem.274
Finally, empirical evidence captures only those variables amenable to
measurement. So much of family law and family life, however, is unquantifiable. Studies about child outcomes tend to focus on metrics such
as educational progress, adult earnings, and mental and physical
health.275 These are important aspects of a child’s life, but so too are the
intangibles: a child’s sense of belonging, trust, and feeling loved, not to
mention the converse of dislocation, distrust, and feeling unwanted and
unloved.276 Family law must account for these considerations. But by
measuring some but not all salient aspects of family life, empirical
evidence presents an incomplete picture of the relevant factors.
Compounding quality and reliability concerns is the reality that legal
actors and advocates are not necessarily able to make nuanced judgments
based on empirical evidence. This is partially about capacity—whether
lawyers, judges, legislators, and executive branch officials have sufficient
training to understand empirical research, including the limitations of
most studies. As noted, research findings are often more tentative than

272. See Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, Facts, and
Solutions, in Marriage at the Crossroads: Law, Policy, and the Brave New World of TwentyFirst-Century Families 141, 151–53 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012).
273. See Jane Waldfogel et al., Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing, Future Child.,
Fall 2010, at 87, 92–93 (“A common challenge in research in this area is that parents who
are single or cohabiting may have attributes . . . that differ from those of married parents
and that also foster adverse child and adolescent outcomes.”).
274. The longitudinal nature of the Fragile Families Study is an attempt to account for
selection bias by identifying events early in a child’s life, such as a high-conflict parental
relationship, that predate a family breakup and might separately influence the child’s
outcomes. See Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Child WellBeing: A Critical Review, in The Future of the Family 116, 127 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al.
eds., 2004).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 97–102 (describing the evidence about child
well-being introduced in the marriage equality litigation).
276. See, e.g., Erik H. Erikson, Growth and Crises of the Healthy Personality, in 1
Identity and the Life Cycle 50, 51–99 (1959) (contending that individuals develop through
eight psychosocial stages and that each stage involves the acquisition of a virtue, including
hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom).
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lay readers might think. Consumers of these studies, however, are not
always aware of their contingent nature.
Legal actors sometimes adopt policies based on incomplete or
preliminary evidence. Early research on mandatory arrest and recidivism
rates for perpetrators of intimate partner violence, for example, showed
that recidivism rates decreased when police were required to arrest a
perpetrator.277 Based on this research, many jurisdictions adopted a
mandatory-arrest policy.278 Subsequently, numerous researchers could
not replicate the results or found only a modest correlation.279 At least
part of the reason was that the original study focused on a particular
population—men who were employed and integrated into their
communities and thus had a reputation to protect.280 The subjects of the
subsequent studies were not employed and had less of a stake in the
community and thus, arguably, less of an incentive to avoid arrest.281
Even with the new evidence about the non-generalizability of the original
research, jurisdictions have been slow to abandon mandatory-arrest
policies, notwithstanding considerable criticism, particularly from
communities of color, about the detrimental impact of increased police
involvement.282
Even when studies seem conclusive, interpretations and understanding of data can change over time.283 Shaken Baby Syndrome is a
notorious example. Many parents and caregivers have been convicted of
homicide based on seemingly settled evidence that three factors—retinal
bleeding, bleeding in the protective layer of the brain, and brain
swelling—are evidence that the caregiver shook the child violently and

277. See Brinig, Empirical Work, supra note 11, at 1095–96 (describing this research).
278. See id. (“Based on Sherman’s study, the single most frequent reform these days is
mandatory arrest.”).
279. See id. at 1096 (citing the subsequent research). For an excellent analysis of
the original study and the replication efforts, see generally Christopher D. Maxwell et
al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Effects of Arrest on Intimate
Partner Violence: New Evidence from the Spouse Assault Replication Program (2001),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188199.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7JE-GBR5].
280. Brinig, Empirical Work, supra note 11, at 1095.
281. See id. at 1095–96 (“When the domestic abuse offender has less stake in
community or employer reputation, mandatory arrest may cause more rather than less
recidivism.”).
282. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 741, 797–98
(2007) (explaining how “tough-on-crime advocates could rally around domestic violence
reform while continuing to internalize and perpetuate racial characterizations of victims
and criminals”).
283. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 10–22, 164–72
(1962) (arguing science does not develop in cumulative, measured steps and instead
reigning paradigms—the accepted wisdom on a particular topic—ultimately become
unstable when they are repeatedly challenged).
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caused the child’s death.284 More recent research, however, casts serious
doubt on the importance of these three clinical findings, instead
suggesting that most child deaths may well have been the result of other
causes, particularly underlying conditions or older brain injuries.285 The
legal system is only just beginning to take note. A federal court recently
vacated the murder conviction of a caregiver on actual innocence
grounds, concluding that the evidence to support Shaken Baby
Syndrome is “more an article of faith than a proposition of science.”286
But many parents and caregivers remain in prison, convicted based on
what may now be understood as spurious findings.287
Perhaps in recognition of their own limited ability to understand
empirical evidence, legal actors can be overly deferential to researchers
and thus often do not act as competent gatekeepers. Some “science” is
pure junk, but it can still affect the legal system—the “garbage in,
garbage out” problem. Parental alienation syndrome, discussed above, is
a good example. By labeling something a “syndrome,” the research takes
on the veneer of science.288 But the underlying work does not begin to
meet the basic standards for scientific research and has been roundly
rejected by researchers in multiple fields.289 Even though the court
system theoretically has a gatekeeping mechanism to check the reliability
of this kind of research—the Daubert standard and its corollaries in state
courts—judges do not always use this standard, especially in family
court.290
The gatekeeping problem is arguably worse in the legislative branch,
in which there is no accepted practice for gathering and examining
284. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Flawed Convictions: “Shaken Baby Syndrome” and
the Inertia of Injustice 1–66 (2014); see also Eichner, supra note 169, at 273–78
(discussing the role of pediatricians in supporting the research and legal reliance on the
triad of symptoms).
285. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 284, at 17–30.
286. Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907, 957 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
287. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 284, at 173–93.
288. Professor Maxine Eichner has documented another example of this
phenomenon. See Eichner, supra note 169, at 213 (criticizing the diagnosis of “medical
child abuse”). As Eichner demonstrates, doctors have developed a new diagnosis of
“medical child abuse,” defined as parents seeking supposedly unnecessary medical
treatment, even when other doctors have ordered the treatment. Id. at 210. Based on this
diagnosis, the child welfare system initiates child protective proceedings, which can lead to
the removal of a child from the home, and the state sometimes brings criminal charges
against parents. Id. at 211. Courts have accepted a diagnosis of medical child abuse as a
distinct form of child abuse. Id. at 219. In addition to arguing that the diagnosis of
medical child abuse violates the constitutional rights of parents to make medical decisions
for their children, and that it circumvents the need for proving actual child abuse, Eichner
contends that the diagnosis of medical child abuse is based on “flawed science and flawed
medical practice.” Id. at 213.
289. See supra note 164.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169.
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empirical evidence in a manner that promotes neutrality and reliability.
Compounding the problem, courts generally defer to legislative
judgments, thus extending the reach of such evidence. This insulation
and lack of accountability make the legislative process particularly
susceptible to co-optation by political forces or incompetence. When the
South Dakota Legislature created a task force to study abortion in the
state,291 the process was tilted heavily in favor of finding problems with
abortion, including the idea that abortion hurts women’s physical and
mental health.292 The findings of the task force provided the basis for
South Dakota’s restrictive laws on abortion,293 and the Supreme Court
relied on them indirectly in Gonzales v. Carhart.294
There is somewhat less concern in the administrative context
because courts have more latitude to act as checks on administrative
decisionmaking. If agencies do not consider all aspects of a problem,
then courts may strike down agency action as arbitrary and capricious or,
in formal rulemaking and formal adjudication contexts, lacking
substantial evidence.295 These are the prevailing federal standards, and
state standards are similar,296 but this oversight might play out differently
at the local level because these agencies typically do not have the same
resources as state and federal governments. Local government agencies
are deeply involved in the operations of the child welfare system and
other aspects of family law yet may be less likely to explore all aspects of a
problem or have the capacity to handle empirical evidence in a careful
and sophisticated manner.297

291. See H.B. 1233, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005).
292. See Reva Siegel & Sarah Blustain, Mommy Dearest?, Am. Prospect, Oct. 2006, at
22, 22–23.
293. See id.
294. See 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citing Sandra Cano Brief, supra note 131, at 22–
24).
295. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (stating that a
court may set aside an agency’s action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law”). An agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously
when it:
[H]as relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
296. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 Va.
L. Rev. 297, 297–302 (1986) (finding states modeled their administrative laws after the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act, which drew upon the earlier federal
Administrative Procedure Act).
297. See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 Yale L.J. 564, 618
(2017) (arguing that “many local agencies have limited resources and lack the
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A different concern is the difficulty of translating social science into
legal rules. It is not always clear how to do so because of the evolving
nature of the underlying research; because legal rules require definite
lines, even if expressed in a standard; and because the research may be
more equivocal, not lending itself to this kind of concrete guidance.298
There is the further problem that empirical work does not necessarily
point in one policy direction in light of the judgment calls and trade-offs
inherent in lawmaking.299 For example, research on overnight visits for
very young children has not established a clear harm to children if they
move back and forth between parents’ homes, but it does suggest some
reason to be concerned.300 This preliminary evidence could be used to
argue in favor of primary custody in one parent. But it could just as easily
be used to argue that concerns about child attachment are not so grave
as to require sole physical custody in one parent and that, instead, other
values, including the involvement of both parents, should shape the
resulting doctrine.301 In short, empirical evidence often raises as many
questions as it might answer.
2. Facts and Values. — Beyond reliability and translation issues,
there are three fundamental concerns: Using empirical evidence focuses
attention on the outcomes of legal rules, avoiding debates about
contested values; empirical evidence allows decisionmakers to cloak
value-based judgments in seemingly neutral garb; and empirical evidence
independent ability to develop sophisticated technical knowledge” but bring a different
kind of expertise in their “mediating and information-collecting function”).
298. For a discussion of these challenges, see Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and
Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 Hofstra L. Rev. 13, 13–14
(2009) (identifying concerns with the law determining children’s capacities based on
scientific research into child development); Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note
251, at 135–41 (highlighting a “scholar-advocacy bias” in the family law context); Terry A.
Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 89, 145–60 (2009) (describing the limitations of using neuroscience in the
context of juvenile justice); Joan S. Meier, Dangerous Liaisons: Social Science and Law in
Domestic Violence Cases 1–3 (Feb. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing law seeks definitive answers by examining specific facts and
discrete events whereas social science engages in ongoing inquiries to answer amorphous
questions about human nature).
299. See Rachlinski, supra note 30, at 917–19 (arguing evidence-based decisionmaking is an easier fit in medicine and business, which have clear goals, such as treating a
patient effectively or maximizing profit, than in law, which is inherently political, with
often contested and competing goals).
300. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 141–44 (summarizing
this research).
301. See id. (making this point); Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development
and the Law, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 755, 772–82, 799–807 (2017) [hereinafter Huntington,
Early Childhood Development] (arguing states should at least consider the underlying
research but should also balance a young child’s need for continuity against other
interests, including the interests of both the child and the noncustodial parent in having a
relationship).
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puts families to the test, potentially replicating historical discrimination
against nondominant families.
a. Skewing Debates. — Family law almost always involves a
consideration of both outcomes and underlying values. Who should
control a frozen embryo?302 Should a mentally disabled parent be allowed
to care for a child?303 How much leeway should parents have to make
decisions for their children?304 And so on. Deciding how the law should
answer these questions is partly about outcomes. Which legal rule about
embryo disposition will lead to the most desirable bargaining regime
between would-be parents? How does a child fare when raised by a
mentally disabled parent? Does parental discretion further child wellbeing? But each question is also a debate about what society currently
values. How should the law balance one person’s desire to procreate
against another person’s desire not to? How much should the law protect
a parent’s right to care for a child when the parenting may be
substandard but not imminently dangerous? How important is pluralism
in parenting? Moreover, many outcomes are values. When family law
seeks to maximize child well-being, this is both an outcome and a value.
When family law seeks to reduce family violence, this is both an outcome
and a value. In short, values and outcomes often blend in practice, with
most family law rules and policies evincing an inexorable mix of both.
Additionally, most family law questions involve competing values.
Consider one of the above examples: parental discretion in childrearing
matters. The law gives parents considerable leeway to use reasonable
corporal punishment,305 and courts distinguish permissible corporal

302. See, e.g., McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 149, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)
(affirming the trial court’s decision that the divorcing couple’s frozen embryos were
marital property and awarding the embryos to the couple jointly, not to be used unless
both parties agreed to implantation).
303. See, e.g., Lisa Miller, Who Knows Best, N.Y. Mag. (Jan. 25, 2016), http://
www.thecut.com/2016/01/how-intelligent-to-be-a-parent.html [http://perma.cc/M47C-JSSV]
(describing a mother’s experience with the child welfare system removing her child
because of the mother’s low cognitive functioning).
304. See infra note 306 (discussing legal regulation of corporal punishment).
305. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.136b(9) (2015) (“This section does not
prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by law or authorized by the
parent or guardian, from taking steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of
reasonable force.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(g) (2015) (“Nothing . . . [in] this
subsection shall preclude a parent or guardian from disciplining a child of that parent or
guardian, or shall preclude a person in loco parentis to a child from disciplining that
child, if done in a reasonable manner . . . .”); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-95(D) (2014) (“This
section may not be construed to prohibit corporal punishment or physical discipline
which is administered by a parent or person in loco parentis in a manner which does not
cause great bodily injury upon a child.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i) (2015) (“Physical
injury . . . exclud[es] reasonable corporal punishment.”).
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punishment from impermissible child abuse.306 At issue in this line
drawing is a concern about child outcomes (whether and what kinds of
corporal punishment harm a child), the underlying value of child wellbeing, and other values, including family autonomy from the state,
parental discretion, societal pluralism, and children’s dignitary interests.
Deciding where to draw the line between conduct that is protected
corporal punishment and conduct that is the basis for state intervention
implicates all of these values.
A central problem with empirical evidence is that it focuses attention
on the outcomes of legal rules and the values underlying those
outcomes. As detailed in Part I, the debate about marriage equality was
centered on the effect of same-sex parenting on children. Child wellbeing is an important outcome and value, but there were other values at
stake too, notably equality, inclusion, and pluralism. The availability of
abundant evidence on same-sex parenting and child well-being meant
that this value took center stage, distracting from the other values. It was
fortunate for advocates of marriage equality that the evidence on
children’s outcomes aligned with the values of equality, inclusion, and
pluralism. But if the empirical evidence had shown that children of samesex couples somehow had worse outcomes, such as lower high school
graduation rates, it would have been considerably harder to argue for
marriage equality on the basis of these other values. To be sure, this
partly reflects the institutional context of judicial review. If the state had
evidence of worse child outcomes, then there might have been a
legitimate state reason for restricting marriage to different-sex couples,
and a court might have upheld the restriction, depending on the level of
scrutiny applied. But this tendency to focus on outcomes and the underlying values—a tendency encouraged and exacerbated by the availability
of empirical evidence—is also a risk at the legislative level, with

306. See, e.g., State v. Matavale, 166 P.3d 322, 341–42 (Haw. 2007) (finding no
criminal liability for striking a fourteen-year-old with various objects for lying); Willis v.
State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 179–80 (Ind. 2008) (finding no criminal liability for a single mother
who hit her eleven-year-old child with history of lying and stealing); State v. Wilder, 748
A.2d 444, 456–57 (Me. 2000) (finding that the father’s actions did not exceed the
standard of permissible corporal punishment and thus the criminal conviction could not
stand); Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 870 (Mass. 2015) (exempting parents and
guardians from liability when the amount of force is reasonable, the use of force
reasonably relates to the welfare of the child, and it does not cause, nor create, a
substantial risk of physical or mental harm); Cobble v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 719
N.E.2d 500, 508 (Mass. 1999) (finding the conduct of a father did not fall within
regulatory definition of child abuse when the father spanked his nine-year-old son with a
belt for misbehaving in school); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 11 A.3d 844,
855 (N.J. 2011) (finding slapping a sixteen-year-old on the face a few times was not
excessive corporal punishment when the slaps left no marks and further noting that use of
“excessive” in the statute “plainly recognizes the need for some parental autonomy in the
child-rearing dynamic”).
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lawmakers choosing to focus on child outcomes rather than consider a
range of values at stake in family law rules.
Moreover, the widespread availability of empirical evidence
encourages decisionmakers to focus on those values that have been
measured and are more amenable to measurement, giving shorter shrift
to the values that have not been measured or are harder to measure.307
Child well-being and family violence, in particular, are susceptible to
measurement and often are measured in social science studies of
families.308 Empirical evidence about these two values ensures they
garner attention in a debate, potentially overshadowing other values.
Moreover, these values are relatively uncontested and present a
compelling case: It is hard to justify a legal rule based on competing
values when the rule might be at odds with child well-being or a
reduction in family violence.309
Further, even if there were empirical evidence about a variety of
competing values, this would not necessarily tell decisionmakers how to
strike a balance among the values. Empirical evidence can clarify the
stakes in a debate—showing how much different policy options advance
or compromise each value310—but empirical evidence does not tell us the
importance of the values.311 Empirical evidence can demonstrate, for
307. As compared with child well-being and levels of family violence, it is harder, but
not impossible, to measure whether a rule advances other values, such as pluralism. The
question is whether such evidence exists.
308. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Barber et al., The Relationship Context of Young Pregnancies, 35
Law & Ineq. 175, 175–76, 192–96 (2017) (reporting the results of a study of eighteen- and
nineteen-year-old women that focused on the correlation between pregnancy and intimate
partner violence); Fragile Families & Child Wellbeing Study, Data and Documentation,
Princeton Univ., http://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/documentation [http://perma.cc/P5A6LL7E] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (listing the types of data collected in a landmark
longitudinal study on families, including “information on attitudes, relationships,
parenting behavior, demographic characteristics, health (mental and physical), economic
and employment status, neighborhood characteristics, and program participation”).
309. This is not to suggest that, in practice, family law decisionmakers necessarily
prioritize these factors. See Meier & Dickson, supra note 161, at 329 (reporting the results
of a study of custody cases and finding that in cases in which the father alleged the mother
was alienating the children, courts switched custody from mother to father at
approximately the same rate regardless of whether the mother alleged the father was
abusing the children).
310. See Michael Simkovic, Young Scholar Medal Recipient’s Address at the 93rd
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute: What Can We Learn from Credit Markets?
12–13 (May 18, 2016) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“My role is to help
policymakers understand the parameters of the tradeoffs that they’re facing. If there are
tradeoffs between economic growth and equality or various values that we care about, they
need information to understand the nature of those tradeoffs.”).
311. Some scholars believe values can be quantified and thus compared. See W. Kip
Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 19–21 (1992)
(describing the willingness-to-pay tool as a means to quantify the value of life); Simkovic,
supra note 310, at 13 (“As soon as you have two absolute values, then you need to start
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example, that heightened evidentiary standards for abuse and neglect
lead to fewer substantiated cases and thus less state intervention,312 but
the empirical evidence does not tell us how to weigh family autonomy
against child safety. For this reason, empirical evidence can play only a
limited role in helping decisionmakers strike a balance among
competing values.
Consider the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). This law and its
state equivalents provide both procedural and substantive protections for
Native American children facing removal from their homes, with an
emphasis on keeping children at home and placing them with a Native
American family if they are removed; the law also gives tribes, rather than
state family courts, jurisdiction over cases involving Native American
children.313 ICWA embraces a broad understanding of child well-being
that includes a child’s ties to a tribe; the law also recognizes a tribe’s
interest in sovereignty and continued vitality.314

making tradeoffs because they sometimes come into conflict. Which means you need some
method of measuring those values against each other, and the measurement that
economists use is money.”). This Essay takes the position that this is a dubious proposition,
particularly with inherently noneconomic values such as protection of the parent–child
relationship and family autonomy. Cf. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the
Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553,
1562–78 (2002) (critiquing the economic approach to measuring values in the
environmental context).
312. See supra note 222 (describing such empirical evidence).
313. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903, 1911–1913, 1915 (2012). For a description of state
equivalents, see State Statutes Related to the Indian Child Welfare Act, Nat’l Conference
of State Legislatures (July 19, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/
state-statutes-related-to-indian-child-welfare.aspx [http://perma.cc/6AC6-CJNK]. Congress
enacted ICWA for numerous reasons, including the need to redress historical
discrimination against Native American families and respect the sovereignty of tribes. See
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4)–(5) (setting forth congressional findings, including “that an
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and . . .
[many of those children] are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and
institutions”). Historically, “the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” Id. § 1901(5); see also Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013) (noting that Congress enacted ICWA to
address the “consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of
abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian
children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually
in non-Indian homes” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989))).
314. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (setting forth congressional findings, including that “there
is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes
than their children”). For an excellent summary of ICWA, the current challenge to the
laws, and the constitutional basis for the law, see Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First:
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In a series of challenges to ICWA, plaintiffs are contesting the law on
multiple grounds, including constitutional arguments that ICWA is contrary to the interests of children because it prioritizes “blood” ties over
children’s welfare, in essence contending that the law’s emphasis on
preserving tribal ties and respecting tribal sovereignty compromises
children’s outcomes.315 The litigation is still in its early stages, but as
courts and legislatures consider the law, the debate about ICWA will
likely turn to evidence about outcomes for children raised in Native
American families as compared with non–Native American families.316
There are two concerns with this use of empirical evidence. First, it
focuses the debate on those values that have been measured.
Decisionmakers will consider empirical evidence about child well-being,
American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 491,
506–17 (2017).
315. See, e.g., Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 2, Carter ex rel. A.D. v. Washburn, No. CV-1259, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Ariz. Mar.
16, 2017) [hereinafter Carter ex rel. A.D. Complaint], appeal docketed, No. 17-15839 (9th
Cir. Apr. 26, 2017). One case was dismissed for lack of standing, see Nat’l Council for
Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 733 (N.D. Va. 2015), and another for mootness,
although the court noted that the “case presents significant constitutional questions” that
“merit careful consideration” in the right case, Doe v. Piper, No. 15-2639 (JRT/DTS),
2017 WL 3381820, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017). Another case is in progress. See Carter
ex rel. A.D. v. Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2016 WL 5464582, at *5 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 29, 2016) (granting motions to intervene in a case challenging the constitutionality
of ICWA). For a description of the challenges, including the institutional supporters, see
Casey Tolan, A Series of New Lawsuits Is Challenging How Native American Kids Are
Adopted, Splinter (July 17, 2015), http://splinternews.com/a-series-of-new-lawsuits-ischallenging-how-native-amer-1793849248 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
316. In one case, the plaintiffs alleged that removing children “from caring, loving
[pre-adoptive] homes and forc[ing them] into placements . . . sometimes leads to abuse,
psychological harm, or even physical trauma and death.” Carter ex rel. A.D. Complaint,
supra note 315, at 7. The plaintiffs further alleged that “[i]n many instances, children are
left in abusive or neglectful Indian families where they are subjected to grave physical or
psychological harm as a result of ICWA” and that “[s]ubjecting these children and families
to ICWA creates delay and uncertainty in the journey to permanent family status, and the
prospect and reality of displacement from stable, loving families causes great harm to
children.” Id. For existing research on ICWA and child well-being, see Gordon E. Limb et
al., An Empirical Examination of the Indian Child Welfare Act and Its Impact on Cultural
and Familial Preservation for American Indian Children, 28 Child Abuse & Neglect 1279,
1285 (2004) (finding eighty-three percent of Indian children who were studied and placed
with foster or pre-adoptive families were placed according to ICWA guidelines and that
seventy-one percent of cases involving foster care placement and eighty-nine percent of
cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights included qualified expert
witnesses). The Limb study further found that the state took tribal culture into account in
eighty-four percent of cases, made efforts to prevent breaking up families in ninety-four
percent of cases, and attempted to reunify the family in fifty-six percent of cases. Id.
Inadequate recordkeeping and incomplete data, however, make it difficult to assess ICWA.
See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-290, Indian Child Welfare Act: Existing
Information on Implementation Issues Could Be Used to Target Guidance and Assistance
to States 1, 2–5 (2005) (discussing the limitations in states’ ICWA recordkeeping).
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especially as defined along traditional metrics, such as physical health
and high school graduation rates. Empirical evidence could document
ICWA’s progress toward other, competing values—such as whether ICWA
preserves a child’s ties to the tribe, the tribe’s tie to the child, and tribal
sovereignty—but if there is no evidence about these factors, then it is too
easy to ignore them in the debate. In short, when there is empirical
evidence about some but not all values, it can bias the debate in favor of
those values that are measured.
Second, additional empirical evidence about a range of competing
values would still beg the question about how to balance these values.
Empirical evidence about whether ICWA advances tribal sovereignty
would not tell us how much to weight this value—what sovereignty means
to the tribe or to society more broadly. Similarly, showing whether Native
American children who are kept home or placed with Native American
families have different outcomes from children removed and placed with
non–Native American families would clarify the stakes of the debate, but
the empirical evidence does not tell us how to balance high school
graduation rates against tribal ties. Instead, it is still necessary to have an
independent debate about how to balance these competing values.
The gravitational pull of empirical evidence toward measurable
values and away from an explicit debate about contested and competing
values is present in numerous legal contexts. Consider the example of
unmarried fathers. A number of laws about parental rights, custody, and
visitation favor unmarried mothers over unmarried fathers and thus are
ripe for constitutional challenge.317 Advocates for fathers seeking to
challenge these laws, however, face a problem because there is not a
clear empirical basis for finding that child contact with unmarried
fathers improves child outcomes.318 Moreover, there is evidence that
317. Under marital-presumption laws, married fathers are automatically considered
legal fathers at birth, whereas unmarried fathers must take affirmative steps to establish
their legal rights; further, fifteen states have laws that automatically grant an unmarried
mother sole custody at the time of birth. For a discussion of these laws, including a listing
of the relevant statutes, see Huntington, Postmarital Family Law, supra note 246, at 202–
05. There are active battles over custody and visitation rules in many state legislatures. See
Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 76–83. And courts are considering challenges as well.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.S., 358 P.3d 1009, 1033 (Utah 2015) (rejecting an unmarried
father’s challenge to his son’s adoption on the grounds that Utah could properly require
unmarried fathers, but not unmarried mothers, to complete an affidavit to perfect
parental rights). Most unmarried children do not live with their fathers. See Carlson et al.,
supra note 233, at 472 (2008) (“[A]mong the large (and growing) fraction of all children
born outside of marriage today, more than three-fifths will be living apart from their
biological father by age 5.”).
318. This is not to argue that children are unharmed by father absence. Indeed, there
is considerable evidence showing such harm. See Colter Mitchell et al., Father Loss and
Child Telomere Length, Pediatrics, Aug. 2017, at 2, 6–7 (reviewing the literature and
showing the results of a new study showing the harm, at a cellular level, of father absence
from death, incarceration, or divorce or separation). The precise question, however, is
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unmarried mothers and fathers experience high levels of intimate
partner violence.319
This empirical background makes it seem like the right rule for
child well-being is to give more custody rights to unmarried mothers,
putting children with the parent who will better care for them and
decreasing interaction between parents who may have a history of
violence.320 Basing a rule on this evidence furthers some (albeit very
important) values—child well-being and a decrease in family violence.
But it obscures competing values, especially equality between parents and
protection of the father–child relationship because neither clearly
furthers the desired outcome of child well-being and both implicate
family violence. In this way, empirical evidence about some values can
eclipse a consideration of other values. And as with debates about ICWA,
the evidence does not tell decisionmakers how to balance the competing
values.
Despite these concerns, empirical evidence can be relevant to the
debate about values, and it is important not to draw a stark divide
between the two.321 Values inform empirical evidence: To the extent
whether involvement of never-married nonresidential fathers—who are much more likely
than divorced fathers to be low income and have low levels of educational attainment, and
who have high levels of criminal justice involvement, see Huntington, Postmarital Family
Law, supra note 246, at 186–88—improves the outcomes of their children. On this point,
there is not yet compelling evidence. More broadly, there is evidence showing a
correlation between improved child outcomes and involvement by nonresidential fathers,
see Kari Adamsons & Sara K. Johnson, An Updated and Expanded Meta-Analysis of
Nonresident Fathering and Child Well-Being, 27 J. Fam. Psychol. 589, 595–98 (2013)
(reporting the findings of a meta-analysis of fifty-two studies of involvement by
nonresidential fathers), but these studies do not disaggregate fathers by marital status and
thus are likely skewed by the inclusion of divorced fathers, who tend to be much more
involved in the lives of their children than never-married fathers, see Huntington,
Postmarital Family Law, supra note 246, at 189–90 (contrasting the experience of children
with nonresidential fathers with “children of divorced parents, who see their fathers more
frequently”). Relatively new evidence is showing that the parenting practices of social
fathers, regardless of marital status, are equal to and in some cases superior to the
parenting practices of biological fathers, as measured by engagement with the
nonbiological child, shared responsibility with the biological mother, cooperation with the
biological mother, and trust by the biological mother. See Lawrence M. Berger et al.,
Parenting Practices of Resident Fathers: The Role of Marital and Biological Ties, 70 J.
Marriage & Fam. 625, 629–36 (2008) (comparing social and biological fathers along these
variables).
319. See Barber et al., supra note 308, at 176, 192–95 (reporting the results of a study
of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old women, which found that “pregnancy relationships
included more than twice the amount [of] disrespect as non-pregnancy relationships,
more than triple the rate of threats, and four times the rate of physical assault”).
320. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Family Policy After the Fragile Families and
Relationship Dynamics Studies, 35 Law & Ineq. 223, 225–35 (2017) (drawing on the
evidence about increased intimate partner violence to argue against a default joint custody
rule for unmarried parents).
321. See supra note 4 (discussing the conflation of facts and values).
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society values something—say, child well-being—researchers are more
likely to study it.322 But empirical evidence can inform values, too. As a
foundational matter, many values in family law contain embedded factual
assumptions. One reason that society continues to support traditional
families is the assumption that, on average, this family form has benefits
for child well-being.323 And indeed there is evidence to support this
assumption.324 But if there were evidence that this was not true, this
evidence might slowly change the underlying value.
Empirical evidence informs values in a more subtle way as well. In
the marriage equality cases, the courts focused on outcomes for
children.325 But the cases were also a proxy for the larger value-laden
debate about whether a family headed by a same-sex couple is socially
acceptable. The two are related: To the extent same-sex parents do not
harm children, this can help make the family form more acceptable.326
And to the extent the family form is more acceptable, this may help
improve outcomes for the children.327
The feedback loop can also work in the other direction. There is
considerable evidence that children raised in plural marriage families

322. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26, 73, 146–151 (discussing empirical data
related to father–child relationships, child custody research, and the neuroscience of
juvenile brain development).
323. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7–12 (N.Y. 2006) (noting the
“undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of children”).
324. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 31–44 (describing the
research establishing that children of married couples have better outcomes than other
family forms but also noting the degree to which the outcomes are correlative, not causal).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 108, 119–120.
326. The process of social acceptance is complex. See Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Multidimensional Advocacy as Applied: Marriage Equality and Reproductive Rights, 29
Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 3–18, 33–40 (2015) (describing the importance of advocating for
social change on multiple fronts). Simply providing more information about a family form
does not necessarily change views, see Cultural Cognition Project Study, supra note 241, at
16 (finding that “[a] majority of Americans say that their position on gay and lesbian
adoption is centered on the welfare of the children” but that “few say they would change
their minds if shown convincing contrary evidence”). For a discussion of the relationship
between social acceptance of same-sex couples and the marriage equality litigation, see
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 293, 313–14 (2015) (arguing
that novel families can gain social and legal acceptance if they satisfy social-welfare criteria
and that LGBT families and advocates were able to make this showing through what the
authors identify as collaborative processes).
327. Courts have acknowledged this connection, finding that legal recognition would
help children by solidifying the legal relationships in the family and giving them
important social capital. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 771 (E.D.
Mich.), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015).
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have worse outcomes than children raised in other family structures.328
There is some evidence that this stems from the practice of plural
marriage itself,329 influencing the view that plural marriage is socially
unacceptable. But it is also plausible that the poor outcomes are at least
partly due to the state’s hostility toward these families. All states prohibit
plural marriage as a matter of civil law, and many states also make it a
crime.330 Thus, families based on plural marriage tend to be highly
isolated.331 Moreover, the illegality of polygamy may well create a
selection effect, with social outliers choosing this family form. If
polygamy were legal, a wider range of people might choose it, including
adults with a broader range of social and economic resources. It is hard
to tell, then, whether the different outcomes stem from growing up in a
family with plural marriage, growing up in extreme social isolation,
growing up with under-resourced parents, or some combination of these
factors. Regardless of the particular cause and effect, the point here is
that empirical evidence and values are interrelated: The social value of
monogamy can influence the empirical analysis of plural marriage, which
in turn reinforces the social value of monogamy.

328. In a case before the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the court relied on the
trial testimony of an expert witness in the field of economics and a review of the social
science literature to find that the practice of plural marriage fosters institutional control of
women by men through “early and arranged marriages, the payment of brideprice, easy
divorce and the devaluing of romantic love”; that women in polygynous relationships
suffer from higher rates of domestic violence and death in childbirth, have shorter
lifespans than women in monogamous marriages, suffer from marital dissatisfaction and
low self-esteem, and have more economic difficulties than women in monogamous
marriages because of a lack of, or inequitable division of, resources; that children of
polygamous marriages, as compared with their counterparts in monogamous families,
have higher infant mortality, elevated risks of abuse and neglect, more emotional,
behavioral, and physical problems, and lower educational attainment. See Reference re:
Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 780–86, 789–90
(Can. B.C.).
329. See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1976 (2010) (summarizing the evidence
on polygamy and finding that the natural sex ratio does not fit the needs of polygamous
communities). In polygamous communities, more females need to be recruited, some
men need to be excluded, or younger females need to be married; in polyandrous
societies, female infanticide is known to occur. Id. at 1976–77. Professor Adrienne Davis
further notes that polygamy tends to lead to statutory rape, incest, and low levels of
education, which contribute to problems with individual well-being. Id. at 1977.
330. See id. at 1968.
331. Utah Office of the Attorney Gen., The Primer: A Guidebook for Law
Enforcement and Human Services Agencies Who Offer Assistance to Fundamentalist
Mormon Families 8 (2011), http://site.demo.utah.gov/attorneygeneral/wp-content/
uploads/sites/9/2013/08/The_Primer.pdf [http://perma.cc/5DFD-B2NG] (“The fundamentalists adapted to a secret, underground lifestyle to avoid prosecution and what they
perceived as persecution from the ‘world.’”).
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In sum, a fundamental concern with empirical evidence is that it
focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules, emphasizing those
values that have been and are susceptible to measurement and
distracting attention from competing values. A debate so conceived is
thus incomplete, with decisionmakers considering some but not all
aspects of the legal question. Further, empirical evidence cannot tell
decisionmakers how to balance competing values. It clarifies the stakes
and provides information about the extent to which rules advance or
compromise different values, but empirical evidence does not tell
decisionmakers which values to consider and how to prioritize them. In
both ways, then, empirical evidence discourages a forthright debate
about competing values.
b. Providing Political Cover. — A second problem is that empirical
evidence can provide political cover for the value judgments that are
made.332 Prioritizing some family relationships—and some families—over
others is an inevitable aspect of state regulation,333 but it is also a deeply
contested political and normative endeavor. Similarly, choosing how to
regulate families necessarily involves a host of trade-offs. Allowing
different-sex, but not same-sex, couples to marry reflected a state
determination about desirable family forms. And reforming the child
welfare system to prioritize child permanency over family integrity, as
Congress did in ASFA,334 reflected a judgment about the lesser
importance of families of origin. In these examples, the state relied, at
332. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 35 (2011) (“It’s also likely . . . that the Court sometimes consciously resorts to
empirical factfinding for strategic reasons. The Justices might well believe that their
decision . . . will provoke less conflict . . . if framed in the seemingly neutral idiom of fact as
opposed to the morally evocative idiom of constitutional principle.”). Professor Libby Adler
has made a related argument, about how the claim of expertise, including by scientists, is
itself ideological. See Adler, supra note 10, at 35 (“[E]xpertise has a history of serving a
depoliticizing function. It cloaks political ideology in neutral garb for purposes of gaining
legitimacy in a discourse in which bare political desire stands counterpoised to legal
correctness.”).
333. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 55–80. The state recognizes
some but not all economic and affective ties between individuals. See Laura A. Rosenbury,
Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 200 (2007) (describing the close
relationships, notably including friendship, that family law does not regulate). The state
provides support to some family groupings but not others. The Earned Income Tax
Credit, for example, supports certain extended family relationships, such as an aunt or
uncle caring for a niece or nephew, but not other relationships, such as an adult caring for
a minor cousin. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 152(c)–(d) (2012). And the state provides different kinds
of support to different families. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 55–
80 (describing how state support for families differs by income group, noting that state
scrutiny and suspicion tends to accompany support for low-income families, and using tax
deductions for middle-income families and food stamps and housing subsidies for lowincome families to illustrate this point).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 170–175.
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least in part, on empirical evidence. In supporting different-sex marriage,
states cited evidence purporting to show the benefits to children of this
family structure.335 And in its radical reform of the child welfare system in
1997, Congress relied on evidence about children lingering in foster care
and the poor outcomes for these children.336
This reliance on evidence may reflect well-intentioned efforts to
inform policy, but there is a more cynical explanation as well. Empirical
evidence obfuscates the normative and political nature of the judgments.
By citing evidence supporting the effects of different-sex marriage on
child outcomes, states sidestepped (at least temporarily) the politically
fraught battle over families headed by same-sex parents. And by citing
evidence about poor outcomes for children in foster care, Congress sidestepped the racially charged debate about breaking up families of color
and instead contended that it was promoting child well-being. In short,
rather than acknowledge that a rule or policy reflects values or elevates
one value over another, decisionmakers can claim they are simply
following the evidence.
Professor Suzanne Goldberg has written about a version of this
phenomenon in constitutional law, arguing that courts play an inevitable
role in choosing among contested normative judgments about a group’s
capacities.337 Goldberg contends that courts are uncomfortable with this
role and thus conceal their normative choice with facts.338 She explains
that courts at times rely on thin facts—which are empirical, uncontested
facts, such as women, not men, give birth—courts mostly rely on thick
facts.339 Thick facts are conclusions that appear to be based on empirical
evidence but actually reflect deeply normative judgments, for example,
that giving birth creates a connection between mother and child.340
These thick facts are not based on actual empirical evidence but instead
on intuition and assumptions.341

335. See supra text accompanying notes 101–102 (describing states’ arguments in the
marriage equality cases).
336. See supra note 171.
337. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1965–76, 1980–88 (2006).
338. See id. at 1965–76.
339. See id. at 1965–70.
340. See id. As Goldberg explains, thick facts “contain both description (group X has
a particular characteristic) and evaluation (the characteristic limits the status or capacity of
group X). Yet courts regularly ignore the contestable evaluation . . . .” Id. at 1965
(footnote omitted).
341. See id. at 1965–70.
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Goldberg argues that empirical evidence can be an antidote to this
tendency, contending that, when properly used,342 this evidence can lead
courts to challenge underlying assumptions and intuitions.343 The
marriage equality trials arguably vindicated this argument. When
advocates presented evidence about same-sex parenting, they were able
to move beyond the notion that gay and lesbian parents would harm
children.344
But empirical evidence can conceal normative judgments in a
different way. Even if decisionmakers are citing actual studies and doing
so rigorously, this reliance on evidence obscures the underlying value
judgments. A legislature can claim it is prohibiting plural marriage
because of the harm to children. A child welfare agency can state that it
is prioritizing child well-being by promoting adoption because of the
harm of staying in foster care. And a court can contend it is promoting
child development by upholding a law giving greater custody rights to
unmarried mothers because of the high rate of intimate partner violence
among unmarried couples. These rationales may be backed by evidence,
but they also obscure underlying value-based choices. Resorting to
empirical evidence makes it seem like the decisionmaker is not taking a
political position and instead is simply following the evidence.
c. Replicating Discrimination. — Finally, using empirical evidence can
be particularly problematic for nondominant families because it risks
replicating historical discrimination. Evidence on unequal outcomes for
different demographic groups may be accurate, but the underlying
conditions that create the family situations are often the result of
systemic discrimination and inequality. Thus, using empirical evidence
about poor outcomes to justify legal rules inflicts a second act of
discrimination.
Return to the legal challenges to ICWA. Apart from failing to
consider multiple, competing values, a focus on evidence about child
outcomes in Native American homes as compared with other homes
obscures centuries of aggressively hostile state policies toward Native
American families.345 Indeed, the explicit, long-standing state policy was
to remove children from Native American homes and assimilate the
children into the dominant culture.346 In light of this and numerous
342. Goldberg recognizes the danger of courts cherry-picking studies that support
their preferred norm without interrogating the methodology or assumptions of the study.
See id. at 1989.
343. See id. at 1989–92.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 234–235.
345. See generally Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian
Nations (2005) (presenting a comprehensive history of the modern tribal sovereignty
movement).
346. See Lorie Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 Legal Stud.
F. 619, 624–31 (2001) (describing this history). Before ICWA, one study found that up to
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other historical efforts to destabilize tribes, it is understandable that
Native American families might not produce the same outcomes, such as
educational achievement, as non–Native American families, as measured
by traditional metrics.347 But uncritically adopting this evidence on
outcomes would perpetuate and replicate discrimination against this
marginalized population.
The same dynamic would likely play out in any litigation over
unmarried fathers. A decision by policymakers to base custody rules on
the absence of evidence that unmarried fathers contribute to better
outcomes for their children would fail to account for the reasons why
these fathers struggle to provide for their children economically and
socially.348 Unmarried fathers are overwhelmingly low income, with low
levels of education and high levels of criminal justice involvement.349 But
for at least some of these men—particularly African Americans—the state
played an active role in shaping their disadvantage. Historically, the state
created and sanctioned pervasive systems of labor exploitation and racial
discrimination, from slavery to sharecropping to segregation, all of which
limited the economic potential of Black men.350 Even when these systems
were no longer lawful, the state adopted numerous other policies that
compromised the economic capacities of Black men,351 from redlining
residential neighborhoods, resulting in racially concentrated poverty, to
maintaining a criminal justice system that stops and frisks young men of
color at highly disproportionate rates352 and treats drug violations by
thirty-five percent of Native American children were removed from their homes, and
eighty-five percent of these children were placed in non–Native American families. See
Steven Unger, The Destruction of American Indian Families 1–2 (1977).
347. See Education, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, http://www.ncai.org/policyissues/education-health-human-services/education [http://perma.cc/Q29F-BS4U] (last
visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“Native students’ academic achievement and educational
attainment lags far behind that of their white peers. Over the past 10 years, Native students
have been the only population to have not improved in reading or math . . . . Native youth
face some of the lowest high school graduation rates . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
348. See generally Edin & Nelson, supra note 233 (examining the challenges of
fatherhood among low-income, urban men).
349. See McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 272, at 147 tbl.8.1 (noting that forty-five
percent of single, unmarried fathers do not have a high school diploma, as compared with
nineteen percent of married fathers; and that thirty-nine percent have been incarcerated,
as compared with seven percent of married fathers).
350. See generally, e.g., William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner
City, the Underclass, and Public Policy 10–12, 109–24 (2d ed. 2012) (arguing that a “racial
division of labor has been created due to . . . centuries[] of discrimination and prejudice”).
351. See generally Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How
Our Government Segregated America 153–76 (2017) (discussing government policies that
prevented African Americans from climbing the economic ladder).
352. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(describing the disproportionate impact of New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy on men of
color).
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Black men much more harshly than similar violations by white men,
despite similar rates of drug use and selling.353 A legal rule based on
evidence about father involvement and child outcomes would fail to hold
the state accountable for the present conditions of many of these fathers
and would risk replicating past discrimination.354
The problem persists in the policy context, in which empirical
evidence about child outcomes in different families raises the question of
whether the state will support all families. As Professor Mary Anne Case
has argued, when parties make a claim on state resources, such as
childcare subsidies, it is not unreasonable for the state to ask for good
outcomes in return for that support.355 This triggers an inquiry into
which families are capable of creating these outcomes.356 Requiring
improved outcomes might lead to less, not more, investment in struggling
families to the extent there is evidence that disadvantaged families are
not well positioned to foster good outcomes for their children.
Compounding the problem, increasingly, studies indicate that it is hard
to improve parenting in low-functioning families—there is a dearth of
evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of parenting programs for such
families.357
In sum, putting families to an empirical test about their ability to
produce good outcomes for their children can lead decisionmakers to
replicate discrimination. Focusing on empirical evidence about outcomes
does not require interrogating the reasons why a group may not be able
to show a positive contribution. It can also direct attention away from
questions about what families need as a matter of dignity and equal
citizenship and instead toward a determination of which families can
perform as the state wishes.

353. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 98–100. Indeed, given this history, it is all the
more noteworthy that unmarried Black fathers are more likely than unmarried white or
Latino fathers to play an active role in their children’s lives. See supra text accompanying
notes 232–233.
354. The argument is somewhat different if the state, in support of custody rules, cites
evidence about higher rates of intimate partner violence between unmarried couples. See
supra text accompanying note 319. In that context, the central concern is that focusing on
family violence overshadows other values, notably gender equality and the father–child
relationship. See supra text following note 320.
355. Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About
Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 1753, 1772–76 (2001) (making this argument in the context of public support for
childcare in commenting on Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking
Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1673 (2001)).
356. See id.
357. See Shonkoff & Phillips, supra note 197, at 226 (“[E]fforts to change the course
of [children’s] development by strengthening parenting have met with mixed success.
Shifting parental behavior in ways that shift the odds of favorable outcomes for children is
often remarkably difficult.”).
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III. GUIDING THE USE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN FAMILY LAW
If family law’s empirical turn brings both considerable benefits but
also substantial reasons for concern, it is essential to develop a framework
to guide the use of this evidence. Decisionmakers must know when and
why to use it, because not all questions can be resolved through empirical
evidence. This Part proposes a framework to guide this process—
encouraging the use of empirical evidence when appropriate while also
preserving space for a wide-ranging debate about competing values.
Further, when empirical evidence is relevant, decisionmakers must be
cautious about how they rely on it. This Part provides tools to guide the
use of this evidence, calling for more effective gatekeeping across all of
family law’s institutions, increased attention to the dangers of
perpetuating discrimination along intersecting identities, and a robust
role for legal scholars in translating empirical evidence into legal rules
and policies.
A.

The Proper Role of Empirical Evidence

Nearly all family law questions reflect contested and competing
values, but some questions do so more than others. Gaining traction on
the issue of when to use empirical evidence requires an appreciation of
this aspect of family law—some questions involve a relative consensus
about a value or which value to prioritize, and some questions involve a
relative lack of consensus about a value or how to prioritize competing
values. Empirical evidence is more relevant to the former kinds of
questions and less relevant to the latter.
As a threshold matter, then, decisionmakers should determine
whether there is consensus about a value or the priority of values.358 If
there is a relative consensus on these issues, then empirical evidence can
help identify policy choices that further the consensus value or effectuate
the decided balance of values. In this context, society and the legal
system have largely resolved the relevant value-based judgments, and
empirical evidence helpfully elucidates policy choices. It is widely agreed
in modern society, for example, that intimate partners should not
physically assault each other, a judgment that, as hard as it is to recall,
358. This raises the questions of how to determine whether there is a consensus on the
underlying judgment and whether there must be consensus that there is consensus. As
with any complex issue, the poles are relatively easy to identify. Compare Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (recognizing—as the first state supreme court to do so—a
constitutional claim to relationship recognition for same-sex couples), with Baskin v.
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming “[t]he district court judgments
invalidating and enjoining . . . prohibitions of same-sex marriage” in one of the last lower
court decisions before Obergefell). With the framework proposed in this section, no more
may be needed: The goal of the threshold question is determining whether the question
falls at one end or the other of a consensus continuum.
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was once much more unsettled.359 Today, the issue facing decisionmakers
is not whether but instead how to achieve this goal, and the question for
family law is one of implementation. Empirical evidence helps
decisionmakers compare alternative rules and policies to determine
which will best reduce intimate partner violence. To be sure, no values
are entirely uncontested, and even furthering seemingly incontrovertible
outcomes requires some consideration of competing values, such as
individual autonomy and family privacy.360 But when there is a clear goal
and a consensus about the underlying value, as well as some sense about
how to prioritize competing values, high-quality empirical evidence can
be immensely useful in the development of policy.
If the answer to the threshold question is that there is no consensus
about a value or there is considerable disagreement about how to
balance competing values, then empirical evidence is less relevant, and
decisionmakers must be particularly careful in their use of this evidence.
The evidence should not dominate the underlying normative question,
and nonquantified or nonquantifiable values must be given due credit.
In these contexts, it is important to look to sources of authority other
than empirical evidence—empathy, a capacity to reason, a sense of
justice.361 This can be a messy and difficult process, and first principles
may not be amenable to compromise. Indeed, it is challenging to find
agreement around values in a rapidly changing, pluralistic society, but
the debate must be resolved on its own terms, as one of values and
norms.362 At the very least it is essential to recognize that the debate
implicates these contested and competing values and that empirical
evidence will not fully resolve the issue.
The legal challenges to ICWA are a good example of the limited
relevance of empirical evidence. The lawsuits raise several value-laden
359. See, e.g., Goodmark, Troubled Marriage, supra note 176, at 9.
360. See Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be Decriminalized?, 40 Harv.
J.L. & Gender 53, 57–69 (2017) (describing the debate about whether intimate partner
violence should be decriminalized in favor of alternative approaches and identifying the
various values at play in the debate, including the autonomy of victims and the desire for
retribution). If there is a residual debate about competing values, such as family privacy
versus a reduction in family violence, empirical evidence can play a limited role in
elucidating the debate. Understanding, for example, whether more intrusive measures,
such as drop-by police visits for families with a history of violence, would reduce family
violence might inform the debate about how to trade off these competing values.
361. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 28 (2d ed. 1993) (summarizing his theory of
reflective equilibrium); Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the
Supreme Court as Super-Legislature, 66 Hastings L.J. 1601, 1602 (2015) (arguing the
Supreme Court acts as a super-legislature in that most constitutional questions before the
Court are not dictated by law and thus the Justices regularly, and properly, consult their
own moral and political values).
362. This raises a host of questions beyond the scope of this Essay, such as whether
courts are well equipped to make moral judgments.
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debates: how to balance a child’s well-being as defined by traditional
metrics against a child’s well-being as measured by a broader set of
interests, including tribal ties; how to weight child well-being versus tribal
well-being; and the value to be attributed to tribal sovereignty.363 For all
of these questions, empirical evidence can elucidate some of the stakes of
the debate, showing, for example, whether children truly have worse
outcomes when kept in Native American homes with some level of abuse
or neglect.364 But empirical evidence fundamentally cannot answer the
question of whether and how to balance these competing values.365
Most family law questions fall somewhere between these poles, with
an incomplete agreement about the underlying values and an
incomplete agreement about how to balance competing values.366 In
these contexts, it is important to make empirical evidence only one part
of the debate and to be explicit about the range of values at stake.
Consider predictive analytics in the child welfare system. This tool
appears to be a cost-effective means for reducing severe injuries and
death, but it also has a high rate of false positives.367 The legal and policy
question is whether this is an acceptable method for triaging child
welfare cases. As a threshold matter, the question falls between the two
poles because, although there is a consensus that society should protect
children from abuse and neglect, there is an ongoing debate about how

363. See supra notes 313–316 and accompanying text.
364. If decisionmakers do consult empirical evidence for this more limited question,
they must do so aware of the dangers, particularly the temptation to justify a political
choice with data and the potential for empirical evidence to replicate historical
discrimination.
365. Even when empirical evidence might help answer a factual question that informs
values, such as the immutability of sexual orientation, we might not want decisionmakers
to consider this evidence. Professor Edward Stein has argued that the existence of a
genetic basis of sexual orientation, for example, should be irrelevant to questions about
sexual-orientation discrimination. See Edward Stein, Sexual Orientations, Rights, and the
Body: Immutability, Essentialism, and Nativism, 78 Soc. Res. 633, 638–54 (2011)
[hereinafter Stein, Sexual Orientation]; see also Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and
the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev.
503, 506 (1994) (arguing immutability is not a requirement for suspect-class status). Even
if a genetic tie could be shown, and he is dubious that it can, Stein is concerned that
consulting evidence about the genetic nature of sexual orientation improperly turns an
ethical judgment about fairness and inclusion into a scientific question. See Stein, Sexual
Orientation, supra, at 634. He believes society should decide questions about the
acceptability of sexual orientation based on values, not science. See id. at 654–55.
366. Part of this depends on the level of specificity with which the question is posed.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1735–
36 (1995) (describing “incompletely theorized agreements,” whereby judges “agree on
the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it,” as “an important
source of social stability and an important way for diverse people to demonstrate mutual
respect, in law especially but also in liberal democracy as a whole”).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 187–196.
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to balance this goal with other concerns, including family autonomy,
family integrity, and disproportionate intervention in families of color.368
Empirical evidence is useful to the inquiry, but it should not
dominate. When an administrative agency is determining how to reduce
child abuse, it should consider multiple approaches to the problem.
Empirical evidence properly guides this process of comparing policies,
shedding light on effectiveness and efficiency. Based on this evidence, an
agency might choose predictive analytics. But because the tool sweeps in
many children not at high risk for death and severe injury, it is essential
to ask whether the trade-off is acceptable. Empirical analysis can shed
some light on an acceptable rate of false positives by demonstrating the
harm to a child of unnecessary involvement with the child welfare system
and the harm to a child from unaddressed abuse or neglect. But
tolerance for false positives is also a value-based judgment, and,
therefore, considerations other than empirical evidence must be
addressed.369 Again, empirical evidence can tell us the risk that
accompanies false positives—how many families are improperly swept
into the child welfare system. And empirical evidence can tell us whether
other policy options further different values—for example, whether
caseworker judgment, as compared with predictive analytics, leads to
more or less intervention for families of color. But empirical evidence
cannot completely determine the acceptability of false positives or how to
weight these and other concerns. This must be debated as a question of
competing values. In short, empirical evidence is useful but not
dispositive.
Turning to a more complex question, consider plural marriage.
Parties encouraged by Obergefell are beginning to challenge the twoperson limit on marriage—sometimes called the next frontier in
marriage equality370—both whether it should be criminalized and, more
positively, whether states must allow multiple parties to marry one
another.371 Taking the affirmative question of a right to marry, the
368. See Huntington, Rights Myopia, supra note 186, at 643–55 (describing these
competing values).
369. Cf. 4 Blackstone, supra note 49, at *352 (“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape,
than that one innocent suffer.”). For further discussion of values and the use of predictive
analytics in other contexts, see Brendan O’Flaherty, Assessment and Prediction in
Homelessness Services and Elsewhere, 50 Austl. Econ. Rev. 229, 229–30, 232, 234 (2017)
(arguing that the use of predictive analytics to allocate homelessness services can work
against notions of fairness, which may be easier to achieve than optimality, and can fail to
identify those truly in need of services).
370. See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams et al., Contemporary Family Law 127–29 (4th ed.
2012).
371. See Collier v. Fox, CV 15-83-BLG-SPW-CSO, 2015 WL 12804521, at *1–4 (D.
Mont. Dec. 8, 2015) (dismissing a case brought by a man and two women challenging
Montana’s criminal law prohibiting bigamy because the parties lacked standing since they
had not engaged in plural marriage and instead were seeking a pre-enforcement
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framework proposed above guides the use of empirical evidence. As a
threshold matter, there is a prevailing, but not uniform, view that plural
marriage is unacceptable.372 Some commentators argue that the practice
is morally repugnant and incompatible with notions of justice and basic
democratic values,373 and others contend that it is possible to have an
ethical vision of polyamory.374 Further, there are clearly competing
values, with a question about how to balance inclusion and pluralism on
the one hand and child well-being and gender equality on the other.375
injunction against the State without any evidence that the State would enforce the
provision); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Utah 2013) (finding Utah’s
criminal prohibition on bigamy unconstitutional as applied to cohabitation), vacated as
moot, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding the case moot because the State adopted a
policy of nonprosecution for cohabitation and thus vacating the decision below), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 828 (2017).
372. For a discussion of the relationship between plural marriage and social
acceptance, see Scott & Scott, supra note 326, at 313–14, 364–69 (arguing that the state
will recognize those novel families that satisfy social-welfare criteria, particularly
interdependence and long-term mutual care, and that polygyny is so strongly associated
with harms, notably sexual abuse and extreme gender inequality, that it will be particularly
challenging for these families to gain social recognition).
373. See Stephen Macedo, Just Married: Same-Sex Couples, Monogamy, and the
Future of Marriage 146–48, 164–65, 184–90, 203 (2015) (arguing against legal recognition
of plural marriage in part because of its associated harms); see also John Witte, Jr., The
Western Case for Monogamy over Polygamy 457–65 (2015) (describing the low social
acceptability of polygamy and arguing that “any change in traditional polygamy laws must
come from below . . . by gradual democratic adjustments”).
374. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 283 (2004) (“Polyamory is a
lifestyle embraced by a minority of individuals who . . . articulate an ethical vision that I
understand to encompass five main principles: self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent,
self-possession, and privileging love and sex over other emotions and activities such as
jealousy.”); see also Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1691,
1762–65 (2016) (arguing that “the law cannot reconcile the inequalities of liberty created
by traditional polygamy” but noting that other forms of plural marriage, apart from one
man and multiple wives, might be reconcilable with equality). In Brown v. Buhman, the
Utah district court assessed the context of plural marriage and was skeptical about any
harm associated with it. 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. The court noted that the historical
perception of the harm was not about actual harm to children but instead the harm from
“introducing a practice perceived to be characteristic of non-European people—or nonwhite races—into white American society.” Id.; see also id. at 1191 (noting the State had
not introduced evidence supporting a finding of social harm and thus there was no
material issue of fact). That said, the court did not decide the substantive due process
challenge by relying on empirical evidence and instead rejected it because of the long
tradition in Anglo-American law of prohibiting plural marriage. See id. at 1194–97.
375. See Gregg Strauss, Is Polygamy Inherently Unequal?, 122 Ethics 516, 516–17,
524–44 (2012) (arguing that the traditional structure of polygyny (one spouse marrying
multiple partners) necessarily creates inequalities but that other forms of plural
marriage—poly-fidelity (each spouse is married to every other spouse) and molecular
polygamy (any spouse can marry outside the original family)—do not, theoretically,
present such structural inequalities). Compare Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1188, 1191,
1194–97 (expressing skepticism about any harm associated with plural marriage but also
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With this question falling between the two poles, empirical evidence may
be helpful, but it is important to calibrate its role.
If a legislature were to take up the issue, lawmakers should debate
whether, as a matter of values, being married to more than one person at
the same time is the kind of decision that consenting adults should be
allowed to make. Lawmakers will need to balance values such as
autonomy, pluralism, and inclusion against the values of child well-being
and gender equality. Although there is considerable evidence on child
outcomes and harm to women,376 it is important for decisionmakers to
cabin that evidence and not let it completely decide the issue. Moreover,
legislators must explicitly embrace the normative nature of the judgment
and not simply hide behind the evidence of poor child outcomes.
When courts consider a legal challenge to the two-person restriction
on marriage, judges should approach the question somewhat differently
from lawmakers.377 As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the relevance
of empirical evidence depends on the type of constitutional challenge to
a ban on plural marriage. In a substantive due process claim, the
question is whether the right to marry more than one person is a
fundamental right, which is a normative, values-based question.378 There
may be some room within this analysis for a consideration of empirical
evidence, particularly with respect to the consideration of children and
the foundational nature of marriage. But this is at heart an inquiry about
values and should be treated as such.
acknowledging the long tradition of prohibiting plural marriage), with Scott & Scott,
supra note 326, at 342 (expressing concern about the relationship between plural
marriage and harm to children and women).
376. See supra notes 328–329 and accompanying text.
377. The framework proposed in this section directs decisionmakers to limit the use of
empirical evidence, but I recognize the argument that, in constitutional cases, citizens are
debating values and typically do so in a language that can reach other citizens who hold
different values. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism
and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 379–85 (2007). Empirical evidence, with its
pretense to be value neutral, can be a powerful language, and thus there is a temptation to
bring it into normative debates. For further discussion of the role of empirical evidence in
constitutional decisionmaking, see Kahan, supra note 332, at 31–41 (describing the debate
about the use of empirical evidence in constitutional decisionmaking); Timothy Zick,
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L.
Rev. 115, 179–202 (2003) (analyzing courts’ increased reliance on empirical evidence in
constitutional cases).
378. As the Court stated in Obergefell, substantive due process “requires courts to
exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the
State must accord them its respect.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
This will entail an analysis of the values that the Court identified as inherent in the right to
marry: that personal choice in marriage reflects individual autonomy, that marriage is the
ultimate form of relationship recognition, that marriage is also about children and
families, which are separately protected in the Constitution, and that marriage is a
foundational social institution. See id. at 2599–602.

302

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:227

If a court does recognize plural marriage as a fundamental right,
then the court would proceed to the second prong of the analysis—
whether “the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.”379 This analysis is about means-end fit, asking whether the
state’s interest in limiting marriage to two people is sufficient to
overcome the infringement on the now-recognized fundamental right to
marry more than one person at a time. In contrast to identifying the
existence of a fundamental right, assessing the state’s interest does call
for empirical evidence. This inquiry would focus on the connection
between plural marriage and harm to children and vulnerable family
members, asking whether prohibiting plural marriage reduces the risk of
these harms. But even in this prong of the analysis, there are nonempirical questions at stake—for instance, what risk of harm that may
result from allowing plural marriage is sufficient to justify the
prohibition? This, too, needs to be answered as a values-based question.
In short, a substantive due process analysis allows only a small role for
empirical evidence.380
Both legislators and judges must recognize the interrelationship of
the values and empirical evidence surrounding plural marriage. As noted
above, one informs the other, and neither can be neatly disentangled.381
The widespread value of monogamy likely influences the empirical
evidence, and this evidence likely influences the value. There is no easy
way around this entwining, but acknowledging the relationship will help
decisionmakers be more wary of both the empirical evidence and the
values influenced by the data, not placing too much weight on either and
understanding that shifting one may influence the other.
In sum, contested and competing values pervade family law. It is
critical to preserve space to debate these issues explicitly, as difficult as it

379. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
380. The analysis is somewhat different in an equal protection challenge. In an equal
protection challenge to a ban on plural marriage, empirical evidence is relevant to
whether the identified category is a protected class. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) (describing the four characteristics of a protected
class: whether the class has been the subject of historical discrimination, has a defining
characteristic that bears a relationship to an ability to contribute to society, has obvious or
immutable characteristics, and is a minority or politically powerless). If the category is a
protected class, then empirical evidence is also relevant to the tailoring between the
classification and the goal of the legislation. Empirical evidence would be relevant to the
state’s articulation of its goal, presumably protecting children and vulnerable family
members from an arguably exploitative family form. If the category is not a protected
class, then under rational basis review, the legislature does not need to show empirical
evidence to support its speculation that the law advances its goal. See FCC v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (explaining that under rational basis review
“legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”).
381. See supra notes 328–331 and accompanying text.
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often is. Similarly, it is essential for decisionmakers to guard against the
tendency to use empirical evidence to cover political choices about
preferred values and norms. The framework proposed in this section
accepts the relevance of empirical evidence but guards against its
domination. Properly implemented, the framework thus addresses the
risk that the empirical turn will allow decisionmakers to avoid and
obscure value-based judgments. Finally, the approach recognizes that
values can be informed by empirical evidence, and thus it allows for
evidence to have its own, perhaps modest, place in the conversation
about values.
B.

Practical Tools

Once decisionmakers determine that empirical evidence is relevant
to the question at hand, this evidence must be used in a manner that
addresses the concerns in Part II. This section identifies three tools to
achieve these ends: (1) improved gatekeeping across family law’s
institutions, (2) greater attention to the ways empirical evidence reflects
but also refracts intersecting identities, and (3) a robust role for legal
scholars in the translation of empirical evidence into legal rules and
policies. The goal of this section is to offer initial thoughts on these tools,
intended to spark a larger debate about how to use empirical evidence in
a manner that takes advantage of its benefits while guarding against its
dangers.
1. Gatekeeping. — Legal actors need to be both more sophisticated
and more skeptical in their consumption and use of empirical evidence.
A core issue is developing more effective gatekeeping mechanisms. As
noted above, federal courts generally follow basic evidentiary rules about
the admission of expert testimony,382 but, too often, family courts do not
and thus admit unreliable evidence.383 Although generally desirable, it
may be unrealistic to reinvigorate Daubert in family court in light of
overwhelming caseloads, minimal support, and generally loose

382. For further guidance to courts on how to use empirical evidence, see John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, A Judges’ Guide to Using Social Science, 43 Ct. Rev. 156, 162
(2007) (advising courts how to obtain, evaluate, and use empirical evidence to establish
legislative facts, adjudicative facts, and social frameworks).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169. For further discussion of how courts
can better evaluate social science research, see John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 477, 498–508 (1986) (proposing that courts evaluate scientific research analogously
to how they evaluate precedent and prioritize research that “(1) has survived the critical
review of the scientific community; (2) has employed valid research methods; (3) is
generalizable to the case at issue; and (4) is supported by a body of other research”); see
also Davis, There Is a Book Out, supra note 11, at 1594–602 (describing how courts can be
more rigorous in their use of social science, expert testimony, and extra-record literature
to determine legislative facts).
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evidentiary standards.384 To address this structural problem, one
approach is to create a review process separated from the individual
courtroom, thus removing the burden from family court judges. A
centralized body of experts could vet the empirical evidence related to the
issues regularly addressed in family court: adolescent development,
domestic violence, coparenting, and the like. This is more than a call for
judicial training, which would help prepare judges for the empirical
world. It is a centralized method for reviewing the voluminous research
and determining which pieces meet the Daubert standard, thus improving
the quality of the research family court judges use. This approach would
present its own challenges, such as ensuring the neutrality and
sophistication of the members of the review board. But if this panel
operated as an additional resource, supplementing but not automatically
supplanting individual review, it would improve the quality of empirical
evidence used in family courts.
Even a strict application of the Daubert standard, however, does not
account for the ways in which empirical evidence fails to reflect
historical, government-supported discrimination. Courts will need to
address this separately. In the context of plural marriage, for example,
when a court is considering evidence of any harms associated with plural
marriage, the court must also ask whether these harms inevitably flow
from the family structure or whether they are at least partly the product
of historical discrimination.385 To the extent there is evidence that
children of plural marriage have worse outcomes than children in other
family structures, courts must question—assuming the underlying
evidence does not—whether these outcomes are due, at least in part, to
state hostility to plural marriage.
Beyond courts, legislative bodies should develop better gatekeeping
mechanisms, as they do not currently have a standard practice for
ensuring the reliability and relevance of empirical evidence. This is
admittedly an enormous topic, and this section cannot identify all of the
current failures and possible solutions, but the basic idea of the
mechanism is to encourage legislatures to consider multiple sides of an
issue. When Congress enacted a series of reforms to the child support
system in the 1970s, it had abundant evidence that child support orders
were inadequately enforced,386 but it did not have evidence that a robust
child support system would ameliorate child poverty.387 Instead of
384. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 328–331.
386. See Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, Inside the Castle: Law and
the Family in 20th Century America 224–31 (2011) (describing the history of federal child
support laws and their inadequacies and shortfalls).
387. This evidence would have been hard to find because low-income, nonresidential
parents generally do not have an income to support their children. See Office of Child
Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Family-Centered Innovations
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considering alternative means for improving child poverty, such as a
guaranteed child-allowance provision, common in many European
countries for more than half a century,388 Congress reinforced the
cultural norm of economically independent families.389 If Congress had
had additional evidence about various alternatives, at least it would have
had to explain why it was not choosing the child allowance—a more
effective,390 albeit less politically popular, policy.
With judicial review of their actions and, for some agencies, internal
norms of evidence-gathering, administrative agencies have some check
on the quality of their decisionmaking, but these agencies still have
tremendous leeway in their use of empirical evidence. It is essential to
develop a system to ensure the empirical evidence agencies use is of high
quality and addresses the concerns about data reliability, the proper use
of the evidence, and so on. Administrative agencies’ capacity to address
these issues is exacerbated at the local government level because budget
constraints and the limits of institutional capacity will mean that agencies
do not generally have access to sophisticated tools for evaluating
empirical evidence. One solution is for agencies to partner with
universities. These research institutions can play a useful role in helping
agencies both identify and critique relevant empirical evidence. The
University of Florida, for example, sponsored a two-day working
conference on early-childhood development, bringing together

Improve Child Support Outcomes 1 (2011) [hereinafter Family-Centered Innovations],
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/family_centered_innovations.pdf [http://
perma.cc/SUL6-UTYA] (“One quarter of all custodial and noncustodial parents are poor
and nearly two-thirds of custodial families in the child support program have incomes
below 200 percent of the poverty threshold.”). Fathers in these families are often unable
to pay even small amounts of money to support their children. See Laurie S. Kohn,
Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income
Families, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 531–44 (2013) (“Research suggests that the majority of
low-income fathers’ failure to meet their obligations is not because of their unwillingness
to support their children, but because they do not earn enough to satisfy their
obligations.”).
388. See Duncan Lindsey, The Welfare of Children 319–20 (2d ed. 2004) (describing
universal children’s allowance programs in Europe and elsewhere).
389. At common law, parents were required to provide economic support to their
children. See Blackstone, supra note 49, at *435 (seeing this duty as “a principle of natural
law,” arising from “nature herself” and the act of “bringing [a child] into the world”
because it “would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave the
children life, that they might afterwards see them perish”); Kent, supra note 49, at 161
(“The father is bound to support his minor children, if he be of ability, even though they
have property of their own; but this obligation in such a case does not extend to the
mother.”).
390. If Congress had compared alternative means, it would have had to address the
research showing that guaranteed child incomes is a more effective means of supporting
low-income families than child support. See Lindsey, supra note 388, at 313–38.
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academics, childcare providers, and government officials.391 The fruitful
exchange was an opportunity to translate the existing knowledge about
early-childhood development into actionable steps at the national, state,
and local level.
2. Attention to Intersecting Identities. — As Professor Robin Lenhardt
has argued, often the law appears to be race neutral but, in operation,
perpetuates racial inequality.392 She contends that when the state
underinvests in schools serving mostly students of color, fails to combat
racial segregation in housing, and does not protect the safety of the water
supply, families, and especially low-income families of color, suffer the
consequences.393 Indeed, there are numerous ways family law obscures
the importance of intersecting identities, including race, class, and
gender. Courts often cast constitutional claims by unmarried fathers as a
contest between married and unmarried fathers, not between unmarried
mothers and unmarried fathers, thus avoiding a debate about sex
discrimination and gender roles in the family.394 Debates about
unmarried fathers risk glossing over the race and class dimensions of
marital status, ignoring the reality that most unmarried fathers are low
income and disproportionately of color.395 Thus obscured, the debate
appears to be between men who willingly assume responsibilities of
fatherhood by marrying the mother of their children and men who shirk
these responsibilities. This framing, however, ignores some of the reasons
for low marriage rates in poor communities, notably governmentsponsored discrimination that has compromised the economic potential
of some men, and especially Black men, making it harder for these men
to provide for their children.396 It also obscures the role of the state in

391. Early Childhood National Summit, Univ. of Fla. Anita Zucker Ctr. for Excellence
in
Early
Childhood
Studies,
http://ceecs.education.ufl.edu/national-summit/
[http://perma.cc/Z8AA-QE2D] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
392. See R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 2071, 2074–77 (2017).
393. See id. at 2088.
394. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in
the Age of Equality, 125 Yale L.J. 2292, 2292, 2334–42 (2016) (arguing that in
foundational cases establishing the limited rights of unmarried fathers, the Supreme
Court framed the conflict as a clash between husbands and unmarried fathers, not
between mothers and fathers, and thus avoided questions of sex neutrality in custody law).
395. See McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 272, at 147 tbl.8.1 (reporting
characteristics of participants in the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study). At the
time of the focal child’s birth, 29.5% of the married fathers had earned at least a college
degree, as compared with 3.8% of unmarried nonresidential fathers; 12.5% of the
unmarried fathers were white, and 58.4% were Black. Id. Many scholars do recognize this
aspect of the debate. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 Md. L. Rev.
55, 79, 106, 118 (2016) [hereinafter Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage] (stating that those
who do not marry differ from those who do marry in ways that affect children and that
nonmarried parents tend to have fewer resources than married parents).
396. See supra text accompanying notes 350–353.
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using marriage as a tool to subjugate nondominant populations—policies
that have made marriage far less appealing to such groups.397
Following Lenhardt’s invitation to uncover the law’s role in
perpetuating inequality, it is essential for decisionmakers to see how
empirical evidence can direct attention to inequality but also obscure
and compound it. Beginning with the potential for empirical evidence to
help uncover inequality, it can show how families of color are
disproportionately represented in the child welfare system,398 arguably
from a built-in bias toward seeing pathology in such families.399 And in
the child support system, empirical evidence can show that the majority
of men who do not pay child support lack the economic means to do
so.400 By documenting these differences, decisionmakers can use this
empirical evidence to better understand the ongoing salience of race,
class, and gender and begin to pay attention to the problem.401 As noted
above, empirical evidence can also be an antidote to discrimination and
demeaning stereotypes, such as the inaccurate image of the uninvolved
Black father.402
On the other side of the ledger, however, empirical evidence can
obscure inequality. When decisionmakers take this evidence at face
value, without interrogating the underlying causes of differential
outcomes along identity lines, primarily race and class, it masks the
source of the inequality.403 Even more troubling, empirical evidence can
compound the salience of intersecting identities. In predictive analytics,
a repeated criticism is the algorithm’s reliance on a parent’s experience
in the child welfare system as a child.404 Even if this is a reliable predictor,
including this data point risks reinscribing discrimination against low397. See generally Katherine Franke, Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality
(2015) (highlighting the potential for undesirable state-enforced legal rules that can
accompany civil marriage).
398. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The AFCARS Report:
Preliminary FY 2015 Estimates as of June 2016, at 2 (2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/cb/afcarsreport23.pdf [http://perma.cc/4N5F-SUFR].
399. See Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al., Race and Ethnic Disparities: A PopulationBased Examination of Risk Factors for Involvement with Child Protective Services, 37
Child Abuse & Neglect 33, 34, 42–44 (2013) (discussing the literature making this claim as
well as the evidence in a study of a California birth cohort); see also supra note 203 (citing
sources discussing possible explanations for the correlations between race and child
maltreatment).
400. Family-Centered Innovations, supra note 387, at 2.
401. See, e.g., Office of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Annual Report to Congress FY 2015, at iii, 9–11 (2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/programs/css/fy2015_part_01.pdf [http://perma.cc/KP25-5QP9] (describing
the reorientation of the child support system in response to the challenges facing lowincome men).
402. See supra text accompanying note 233.
403. See supra section II.B.1.
404. See supra text accompanying note 190.
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income families of color. For Native American families, in particular, this
risk factor would expose exceptionally high numbers of parents to
greater scrutiny. Native American children face the highest cumulative
risk of foster care placement, even with the protections of ICWA in
place.405 To the extent the prior foster care placements reflect some form
of bias and not only higher rates of maltreatment, including the foster
care placement history of a Native American parent as a factor in the
algorithm recreates this discrimination.
In sum, when using empirical evidence to make decisions, it is
essential for decisionmakers—legislators, courts, and administrative
officials—to be attuned to the potential for empirical evidence not only
to uncover inequality but also to compound it. Decisionmakers must ask
whether the underlying evidence is a reflection of historical
discrimination. And then they must ask whether the use of empirical
evidence will perpetuate that discrimination.
3. A Translation Role for Legal Scholars. — Finally, there is a pivotal
role for legal scholars in guiding the use of empirical evidence.406 The
legal system always needs better research and more reliable data, but
more fundamentally it needs sophisticated translation of social and hard
science into legal rules and policies. Researchers outside of the legal
academy are not well positioned to turn their findings into legal rules
and policies, and indeed trying to do so risks compromising the
underlying research.407 But legal scholars are well suited to this work.408
Policy analysis is one of the archetypes of legal scholarship, with scholars
identifying problems, objectively comparing evidence about alternatives,
and recommending solutions.409 Moreover, this translation work is more
405. See Christopher Wildeman & Natalia Emanuel, Cumulative Risks of Foster Care
Placement by Age 18 for U.S. Children, 2000-2011, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 5 (2014) (finding a
5.91% cumulative risk of placement in foster care for all children in the United States
before age eighteen, but with sharp differentials by race and ethnicity). Asian children
face a 2.14% risk, white children a 4.86% risk, Latino children a 5.35% risk, Black children
a 10.99% risk, and Native American children a 15.44% risk of placement in foster care. Id.
406. Family law scholars can also produce empirical research, as some are already
doing. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any
Difference?, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 304, 304 (2011) (studying the effect of a joint custody presumption on custody determinations); Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen,
“These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 Am. L. &
Econ. Rev. 126, 126–30 (2000) (studying which parent files for divorce most often and
examining the relationship between filing and custody disposition); Meier & Dickson,
supra note 161, at 331–34 (reporting the results of a study finding a negative correlation
between a mother alleging abuse and the award of child custody).
407. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 135.
408. See Huntington, Early Childhood Development, supra note 301, at 792–801, 806–
10 (arguing legal scholars should play a pivotal role in translating the empirical evidence
on early childhood into legal rules and policies).
409. Martha Minow, Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide, 63 J. Legal Educ.
65, 66 (2013); see also id. at 67 (describing another model of legal scholarship as
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than simply reconciling divergent studies. It requires the integration of
other bases for legal regulation, including a consideration of values,
morality, and so on.410 Legal scholars can help put empirical work in
context, noting instances in which the research advances a particular
goal but the legal system may want to do something other than simply
advance that goal.
Family law scholars are on the right path, regularly drawing on
empirical work from a range of disciplines, including sociology,411
economics,412 psychology,413 and neuroscience.414 Family law scholars
integrate the wealth of information available about families, from indepth ethnographic studies about unmarried parents415 to detailed
statistical portraits of marriage rates.416 Often, the empirical evidence
does not answer questions as much as fuel additional debate, with scholars using empirical evidence to support different arguments.417 But this
“[t]est[ing] a proposition about society or the economy or about human beings that is
used by lawyers or assumed in legal sources” and then either conducting or analyzing
empirical work about this assumption before “digest[ing] the findings for legal
audiences”).
410. Cf. Sandler et al., supra note 251, at 151 (describing the role of advocacy, as
compared with research, and noting “[s]uccessful advocacy involves multiple factors
beyond the translation of empirical research findings into action, including attending to
the morality, ethics, related laws and legal procedures, civil rights, social values and mores,
feasibility, and economic costs of action proposals”).
411. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013
Mich. St. L. Rev. 1185, 1218–19 (relying on the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study).
412. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transactions Costs on the Market for
Babies, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 553, 553–60 (1994) (relying on economic principles and
research to analyze adoption law).
413. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and
Conflict After Divorce, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441, 442–48 (2008) (relying on
psychological research to argue for a model of forgiveness in family law).
414. See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 298, at 145–60 (exploring the use of
neuroscientific evidence in the juvenile justice system).
415. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L.
Rev. 921, 937 (2013) (relying on the ethnographic work of Kathryn Edin, among others).
416. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How Inequality Is
Remaking the American Family 11–20 (2014).
417. Compare Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 395, at 111 (citing
empirical evidence about the ability of unmarried parents to negotiate financial support
and time with the children without the legal system, and thus arguing that the legal system
should not change the current treatment of unmarried parents), with Huntington,
Postmarital Family Law, supra note 246, at 227–29 (drawing on research about nonmarital
families to argue for reforms to family law, particularly that unmarried fathers should have
similar rights to unmarried mothers). For other scholarship using empirical evidence to
make arguments about whether and how to regulate unmarried couples, see Cynthia
Grant Bowman, Unmarried Couples, Law, and Public Policy 169–70 (2010) (arguing the
differences between married and cohabitating couples—such as different levels of stability,
domestic violence, and economic interdependence—combined with the fact that many
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scholarship does advance the conversation. The point here is to
encourage and guide this continued engagement with empirical work.
As family law scholars continue this translation project, however, it is
important to be attentive to the concerns about empirical evidence identified in this Essay. A starting point is recognizing our own ideological
commitments, which can seep into the selection, consideration, and
translation of empirical evidence. Beyond this basic point, family law
scholars should consider the guidelines set forth in this Part—using
empirical evidence to advance specified outcomes while remaining
mindful of the limited role for empirical evidence in debates about contested and competing values. And scholars should pay particular attention to the role of empirical evidence and intersecting identities. This
involves the consideration of factors such as the socially constructed
hierarchies of families along various identities; the role of historical
discrimination in creating current family conditions, particularly the
stratification along race and class lines; the role of race in constructing
all families, including white families; the acceptance of a range of family
forms without using the nuclear family as the default norm; and so much
more.418
CONCLUSION
Family law’s reliance on empirical evidence is not going away. Nor
should it. Using empirical evidence to inform difficult policy choices and
evaluate different legal rules is and should be an integral component of
good governance. But the empirical turn also presents considerable
cause for concern. Beyond the oft-cited issues of data reliability and the
ability of legal actors to use empirical evidence appropriately, there are
fundamental concerns that empirical evidence focuses attention on
outcomes rather than on competing values, cloaks normative judgments,
and risks replicating historical, state-sponsored discrimination.
To address these issues while also capturing the benefits of empirical
evidence, this Essay has proposed a framework to guide the use of
empirical evidence. This evidence has utility, but decisionmakers in
family law must preserve space for debating values, avoid using evidence
to claim neutrality, and be wary about the potential for reinscribing discohabitating couples are economically disadvantaged and have children, should
encourage governmental recognition of cohabitational unions); Marsha Garrison, Is
Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 815, 839–41, 861–63 (2005) (drawing on empirical evidence indicating that
married and cohabitating couples view their relationships differently and display different
behavior to argue that children benefit from having married parents and that the law
should encourage marriage by treating married couples differently from cohabitating
couples).
418. Lenhardt, supra note 392, at 2101–03 (proposing that these and other factors
should be considered in understanding the role of race in family law).

2018]

THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW

311

crimination. When empirical evidence is relevant, more effective
gatekeeping mechanisms across the institutions of family law are critical,
as is closer attention to the ways empirical evidence can compound the
legal salience of intersecting identities. Finally, family law scholars should
continue to play an active role in the translation of empirical evidence
into legal rules and policies.
By identifying the trend toward increased use of empirical analysis,
and discussing its potential benefits and drawbacks, it is possible to chart
a better course for the use of empirical evidence in family law. Using
empirical evidence when appropriate, but cabining it when necessary,
creates a more effective but also a more balanced and inclusive family
law, benefiting individuals, families, and society as a whole.
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